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CYBERSECURITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE:  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
ELDAR HABER* AND TAL ZARSKY** 
ABSTRACT 
 Nations and their citizens rely on infrastructures. Their incapacitation or destruction 
could prevent nations from protecting themselves from threats, cause substantial economic 
harm, and even result in the loss of life. Therefore, safeguarding these infrastructures is an 
obvious strategic task for any sovereign state. While the need to protect critical infrastruc-
tures (CIs) is far from novel, digitization brings new challenges as well as increased cyber-
risks. This need is self-evident; yet, the optimal policy regime is debatable. The United States 
and other nations have thus far opted for very light regulation, merely encouraging volun-
tary steps while choosing to intervene only in a handful of sectors. Over the past few years, 
several novel laws and regulations addressing this emerging issue have been legislated. Yet, 
the overall trajectory of limited regulatory intervention has not changed. With that, the wis-
dom of such a limited regulatory framework must be revisited and possibly reconsidered. 
This Article fills an important gap in the legal literature by contributing to and promoting 
this debate on cyber-risk regulation of CIs, while mapping out the relevant rights, options, 
and interests this ‘critical’ debate entails and setting forth a regulatory blueprint that bal-
ances the relevant factors and considerations. 
 The Article begins in Part II by defining CIs and cyber risks and explaining why cyber 
risk requires a reassessment of CI protection strategies. Part III describes the means used 
by the United States and several other nations to address cyber risks of CIs. Part IV exam-
ines a market-based approach with minimal governmental intervention to critical infrastruc-
ture cyber-regulation, along with the various market failures, highlighting assorted minimal 
measures to correct these problems. It further examines these limited forms of regulation, 
which merely strive to bridge information and expertise barriers, assign ex post liability for 
security-related harms, or provide other specific incentives—and finds them all insufficient. 
Part V continues the normative evaluation of CI cyber-protection models, focusing on ex ante 
approaches, which require more intrusive government involvement in terms of setting and 
enforcing standards. It discusses several concerns with this regulatory strategy, including 
the lack of governmental expertise, regulatory capture, compromised rights, lack of trans-
parency, and the centralization of authority. Finally, in Part VI, the Article proposes a  
blueprint for CI cyber protection that goes beyond the mere voluntary regulatory strategy  
applied today.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Nations and their citizens rely on infrastructures. Modern societies 
depend on electricity and transportation systems, banking and tele-
communications, postal and shipping, and a variety of additional ser-
vices that enable modern life and allow humanity to flourish.1 Disrup-
tion of such services could cause annoyance, inconvenience, and finan-
cial losses to civilians, companies, and governments. Incapacitation or 
even destruction of infrastructures could result in more than mere in-
convenience. It could eliminate nations’ abilities to protect themselves 
from both domestic and foreign threats, cause substantial economic 
harm, lead to social unrest, and even result in loss of life. Therefore, 
protecting these infrastructures—especially those deemed critical—is 
an obvious strategic task and even duty of any sovereign state. 
 While the need to protect critical infrastructures (CIs) is far from 
novel, digitization brings about new challenges. In the pre-digital 
world, the government’s role in protecting infrastructures was rela-
tively justifiable and straightforward, as risks both originated and ma-
terialized in the kinetic realm. Thus, government and the relevant 
public and private entities2 that controlled the infrastructures could 
focus on ensuring physical security by improving their resilience 
                                                                                                                  
 1. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES, at ix (2012) (“We depend heavily on shared infrastructures, yet it is difficult to 
appreciate just how much.”).  
 2. In the United States, much of the CI is privately owned. For more on privatization 
of infrastructures in the United States, see Ellen Dannin, Crumbling Infrastructure, Crum-
bling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Lo-
cal Governance, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 47 (2011). 
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against harms and by investing in protective and defensive measures 
from these well-known (if not predictable) risks.  
 The rise of the digital age substantially changes and realigns the 
threats CIs face and the forms of responses needed. CIs now rely on dig-
ital systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA)3 operations. In some cases, these systems feature remote ac-
cess and even control CIs. These and other technologies used for the 
monitoring and operation of CIs surely improve their functionality and 
generate vast social utility. Yet, employing digital measures expose 
CIs—and thus the state and society in general—to increased risks: risks 
of the cyber realm.4 Such threats can materialize with both digital- and 
kinetic-related outcomes. In other words, they could manifest in the loss 
of data, the breakdown of a computerized system, or even the malfunc-
tion of electric grids, train systems, or sewage plants. Protecting CIs 
from cyber threats is therefore a substantial challenge of critical im-
portance that is making its way from the desks of worried bureaucrats 
and policymakers to the mainstream press and public at large. 
 While the need to protect CIs from cyber risks is obvious, the opti-
mal policy regime for achieving it is not. The United States and some 
other nations have thus far opted for very light regulation, merely en-
couraging voluntary steps while choosing to only intervene in a hand-
ful of sectors considered decidedly ‘critical.’ Yet the wisdom of applying 
a limited regulatory framework is currently under debate in the 
United States and worldwide. As the policy debate unfolds across the 
globe, a critical analysis of this timely issue and the delicate balance 
it involves is currently missing from legal academic literature. This 
Article intends to fill this gap, while mapping out the relevant rights, 
options, and interests this critical debate entails. 
 The Article proceeds as follows: Part II attends to the conceptual 
building blocks essential for the discussion to follow. It explains how 
the subsequent analysis defines CIs and cyber (as opposed to other) 
risks and discusses responses to date. It further argues that the digital 
age has brought about a new form of risk that requires reassessing CI 
protection strategies. Part III describes the current means used to gov-
ern and address cyber risks to CIs. It demonstrates that the United 
States has, thus far, generally relied on a ‘hands off’ approach (with 
some notable exceptions), merely generating frameworks for data 
sharing and voluntary standards for the private entities involved. This 
response differs from that of other countries, which set forth more in-
                                                                                                                  
 3. See infra note 15. 
 4. See, e.g., JAYSON M. SPADE, INFORMATION AS POWER: CHINA’S CYBER POWER AND 
AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY 26 (Jeffrey L. Caton ed., 2012), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/ 
gpo30152/ChinasCyberPowerandAmericasNationalSecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA9E-7WGG] 
(arguing that “a full scale critical infrastructure cyber attack could cost $700 billion”). 
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trusive regulatory regimes that do not shy away from setting manda-
tory requirements for CIs—even when privately owned. Part IV begins 
the analytic search for an optimal form of regulation to assure protec-
tion of CIs from cyber threats. This Part starts by examining a market-
based approach with minimal government intervention. While point-
ing out the shortcomings of such a minimalistic approach, this discus-
sion highlights various measures to correct this type of regulation. In 
addition, this Part further examines limited forms of regulation that 
merely strive to correct information and expertise barriers, assign ex 
post liability for security-related harms, or provide other specific in-
centives. This Part normatively evaluates these models, concluding 
that on their own, they are insufficient to optimally protect CIs.  
 Part V continues the normative evaluation of CI protection models, 
focusing on ex ante approaches that require more intrusive govern-
ment involvement through setting and enforcing standards. This Part 
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of these approaches, noting that 
they could, to a great extent, protect CIs. They also raise several con-
cerns, however, including insufficient government expertise, regula-
tory capture, compromised rights, lack of transparency, and centrali-
zation of authority. Finally, in Part VI, after discussing existing CI 
protection models, this Article presents a proposed blueprint for CI 
cyber protection that accounts for and balances the various benefits 
and concerns set forth herein. This Article argues that regulators can-
not take risks to CI lightly, but at the same time, suggests the imple-
mentation of measures that are consistent with civil liberties and tai-
lored to the relevant threats and technologies. The Article concludes 
by noting the academic and regulatory challenges that remain to be 
resolved regarding this critical issue at hand.  
II.   PROTECTING (DIGITAL) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A.   Conceptual Building Blocks: CIs, Cyber (and Other) Risks, Out-
comes, and Responses 
 Before examining and critiquing the policy landscape of CI cyber 
protection, a broad set of terms, motivations, and taxonomies must be 
introduced. First, what types of infrastructures are considered critical? 
Second, what forms of risks, both old and (more importantly) new, do 
they face? Third, what sort of negative outcomes could unfold, and con-
sequentially, which responses are relevant? We address these basic 
questions in turn.  
 First, we must determine what renders an infrastructure critical, 
noting the importance of proceeding cautiously with this task. Too 
broad of a definition would place an economic burden on private cor-
porations, government, and thus consumers, and taxpayers. But too 
narrow of a definition would exclude truly critical infrastructures from 
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regulatory schemes and lead to vulnerabilities, costs, and possible cat-
astrophic outcomes. Originally, the U.S. regulatory framework defined 
CIs to include any infrastructure that “prolonged disruptions [which] 
could cause significant military and economic dislocation.”5 The White 
House, in Executive Order 13,010, broadened the definition to include 
“[c]ertain national infrastructures . . . so vital that their incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or eco-
nomic security of the United States.”6 In 1998, under Presidential De-
cision Directive #63 (PDD-63), CIs were construed as “those physical 
and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the 
economy and government.”7 Thus, toward the end of the previous cen-
tury, the United States established two criteria for CIs: national de-
fense and economic security. 
 Over time, and post 9/11, the United States added two additional 
criteria: public health and safety and national morale.8 The national 
morale categorization was mostly used for CIs that were “national 
monuments and icons,” as determined by the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) in its 2002 report.9 However at a later stage, na-
tional morale CIs were reclassified as mere “key assets.”10 Thus, only 
three categories—national defense, economic security, and public 
health and safety—are included in the current U.S. CI framework.11 
While other countries use different definitions, this Article relies on 
this formal definition employed by the United States.  
                                                                                                                  
 5. JOHN MOTEFF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31556, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: 
WHAT MAKES AN INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICAL? sum. (2003). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996); see also MOTEFF ET 
AL., supra note 5, at CRS-5. Executive Order 13,010 included the following infrastructures: 
“telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, bank-
ing and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services . . ., and continu-
ity of government.” Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347, 37,347 (July 17, 1996). 
 7. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-63, 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 1 (1998) [hereinafter CLINTON POLICY]; see also 
MOTEFF ET AL., supra note 5, at CRS-7. 
 8. MOTEFF ET AL., supra note 5, at CRS-16. 
 9. See PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 15 
(2002), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BN-QLVX]. 
 10. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY 30 (2002), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-
2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD36-EJZK]. Key assets are “individual targets whose destruc-
tion would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage 
our nation’s morale and confidence.” MOTEFF ET AL., supra note 5, at CRS-8. 
 11. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools  
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 § 1016, 42  
U.S.C. § 5195(e) (2012). A similar definition of critical infrastructure first appeared in 2000 
under a National Plan for Critical Infrastructure. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
DEFENDING AMERICA’S CYBERSPACE: NATIONAL PLAN FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
PROTECTION VERSION 1.0: AN INVITATION TO A DIALOGUE iii (2000), https://fas.org/irp/off-
docs/pdd/CIP-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QR6-F4KQ]. 
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 It is important before proceeding to note the relationship between 
cyber attacks and CIs. Although cyber attacks seemingly take place in 
the cyber world, they cause physical, real, and non-cyber harms and 
damages. Thus, protecting CIs could take on a multitude of forms 
(cyber and/or physical-kinetic). While this Article is concerned with 
cyber attacks and risks, both the outcomes and countering measures 
are closely tied to the physical/kinetic world. Accordingly, the short 
discussion in the following paragraphs strives to explain the focus of 
this Article and, more specifically, the relationship between cyber and 
physical/kinetic elements.  
 Cyber risks might materialize on several levels. Comparatively, an-
alog world risks generally threaten physical infrastructures, or at 
least, damage to areas in close proximity to them. Thus, in addition to 
intelligence gathering, fears of analog world risks can usually be miti-
gated by creating physical barriers and perimeters. Physical security 
of this sort is, of course, essential to discourage cyber risks as well. IT 
infrastructures face physical attacks or direct computer access with 
the intention to damage the CI. Yet as this Article explains below, CIs 
can also be harmed through remote digital access—i.e., the saboteur 
has no need to be in the area. Thus, decreasing cyber attacks on CIs 
calls for an additional set of protective measures.  
 Moreover, the prospect of cyber attacks against CIs introduces a spe-
cific subset of outcomes and risks that is discussed throughout this anal-
ysis. In a purely analog world (one without central IT systems in CI op-
erations), system damage and destruction constitute the main risks to 
CIs. While relevant in the cyber realm as well, these risks and outcomes 
are joined by additional ones, such as information theft (including per-
sonal data) and unwanted data alteration. Although these novel risks 
might not seem as severe, they do require a different set of measures 
and responses—ones with which regulators are currently grappling.  
B.   Cyber Attacks: A Growing Threat that Calls for a Response 
 The intentional actions of human adversaries as part of armed or 
unarmed conflicts between nations, criminal activities (including 
various types of hacking), revengeful measures of disgruntled em-
ployees, or acts of terrorism pose a substantial threat to CIs. CIs—
both at a physical and digital level—also face the same risks as a 
result of unintentional actions, such as human error, poor design, 
and even natural causes.12 While these latter issues are not discussed 
                                                                                                                  
 12. JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: 
BACKGROUND, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2015), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=767176 
[https://perma.cc/2877-BVJM]. 
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in the following analysis, many of the points made in the subsequent 
Parts herein pertain to them as well.  
 There are several convincing reasons to believe that CIs are gener-
ally attractive targets.13 First, CI targets are numerous and spread 
out, rendering them vulnerable. Second, CIs are, in many cases, inter-
dependent. Disruptions caused to one sector could have repercussions 
across many others. For instance, an attack against a country’s power 
grid could negatively affect transportation, communications, and 
emergency service infrastructures. Third, attacks against CIs could 
have a powerful psychological effect on society. Therefore, adversaries 
have a publicity incentive to attack them and enhance their visibility 
and prestige. Fourth, due to a variety of market failures, private CI 
owners may under-invest in security measures and lack necessary in-
telligence on impending attacks.  
 While the risks noted above might seem sufficient motivation for a 
regulatory-based discussion, some may argue these risks have already 
been sufficiently mitigated in the existing equilibrium between state 
regulation, public pressure, and market forces. This might be true. Yet 
the increase in cyber risks and their associated outcomes alters the 
status quo and demands urgent re-examination of the issue at hand. 
To illustrate this point, we consider the existing analytical paradigm 
used by the DHS to assess CI’s risks.  
 In its efforts to formulate a balanced and appropriate defense, and 
to ensure that the risks to CI facilities and security measures are 
matched appropriately, the DHS Risk-Based Performance Standards 
identified three factors that indicate a security risk: (1) likelihood of a 
successful attack (vulnerability); (2) existence of an adversary with the 
necessary intent and capabilities to attack the facility (threat); and (3) 
consequences of a successful attack on a facility (consequence).14 This 
Article uses the DHS Risk factors and explores the impact of digitiza-
tion on them. This inquiry shows that the growing presence of ‘cyber’ 
elements calls for reconsideration, and possibly readjustment, of the 
CI’s cyber protection strategy.  
 Digitization, cyber and vulnerability. The move toward digitization 
within CIs has increased dependency on technology, which, in turn, 
may have reduced some of the existing threats, especially those asso-
ciated with human negligence. However, this move may have also in-
                                                                                                                  
 13. For some of these reasons, see Joe D. Whitley et al., Homeland Security, Law, and 
Policy Through the Lens of Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS 
259, 268-73 (2007). 
 14. See RISK STEERING COMM., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS RISK LEXICON 17, 30 (2008), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_risk_lexicon.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XML-8Y6X]. 
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creased vulnerability, or at least generated new forms of it. To demon-
strate, note that CI operators use SCADA systems,15 as well as other 
computers and networks,16 to monitor and control CI systems. Moreo-
ver, CIs are often networked and even connected to the Internet,17 
which too generates a novel set of vulnerabilities18 as now attacks can 
be launched remotely.19 At times, CIs might be interconnected among 
themselves. In some cases, this form of vulnerability is compounded 
by the fact that such technology and equipment may be of foreign 
origin and therefore prone to abuse.20 CIs’ vulnerability further in-
creases because cyber attacks can be ongoing and are adaptable, which 
increases their likelihood of success.21 
 Scope of Cyber Threat: Resources and Location. Let us begin with 
an intuitive, yet questionable, assumption—cyber attacks are less ex-
pensive to execute than physical attacks. If this is indeed the case, the 
possibility of cyber attacks exacerbates the threats CIs face today. But 
we must be cautious of this generalization. Not every cyber attack 
comes cheap,22 especially not sophisticated ones. Consider the alleged 
                                                                                                                  
 15. “SCADA systems are used to monitor and control a plant or equipment in industries 
such as telecommunications, water and waste control, energy, oil and gas refining and trans-
portation.” NAT’L COMMC’NS SYS., TECH. INFO. BULLETIN 04-1, SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND 
DATA ACQUISITION (SCADA) SYSTEMS 4 (2004), https://scadahacker.com/library/Docu-
ments/ICS_Basics/SCADA%20Basics%20-%20NCS%20TIB%2004-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JW3X-FB4N]. 
 16. Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in 
Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 407 (2007) (“Networked computer systems form the 
nerve center of the country’s critical infrastructure.”). 
 17. See Robert Kenneth Palmer, Critical Infrastructure: Legislative Factors for Pre-
venting a “Cyber-Pearl Harbor,” 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 289, 302-03 (2014). 
 18. Gareth Evans, Protecting Critical Infrastructure in the Digital Age, ARMY-
TECHNOLOGY.COM (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.army-technology.com/features/featureprotect-
ing-critical-infrastructure-in-the-digital-age [https://perma.cc/AJ9P-JFT3] (“For centuries 
CIP simply involved ensuring that your enemy did not physically destroy [your CIs], nor take 
control of them away from you by force. In the digital age, however, things have become more 
complex, as conflict has gone online - and the potential implications for CIP are enormous.”). 
 19. For more on the potential vulnerabilities of SCADA, see Rodrigo Chandia et al., 
Security Strategies for SCADA Networks, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 117 (E. 
Goetz & S. Shenoi eds., 2008). 
 20. Natasha Solce, Comment, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Mili-
tary Branch— The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 307-09 (2008) (listing vulner-
abilities in the “cyber battlefield”). 
 21. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 618 (2011) [here-
inafter Bambauer, Conundrum]. 
 22. One study suggested that it would take “thirty hackers with a budget of $10 mil-
lion [to] bring the United States to its knees.” See Scott Dynes et al., Cyber Security: Are 
Economic Incentives Adequate?, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 
19, at 15. 
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use of the ‘Stuxnet’ computer worm to attack Iran’s uranium enrich-
ment centrifuges.23 Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated weapon, which 
required substantial manpower and expertise to create.24 It was espe-
cially tailored for a very specific computer system as well as for stealth 
activation and operation. If this example is indicative, cyber attacks 
might be just as costly and difficult to execute as physical ones, if  
not more.  
 But not all cyber attacks aspire to meet the high ‘Stuxnet’ standard. 
There are other forms of cyber attacks that are neither sophisticated 
nor expensive. Cyber attacks can be deployed by exploiting unsophis-
ticated technological vulnerabilities without using substantive human 
or economic resources. In fact, information on ‘how to execute a cyber 
attack’ is widely available online for free, as are free or cheap exploi-
tation tools.25 Whether these types of attacks constitute a strategic risk 
to, or a mere nuisance for, CIs is currently unclear. That said, there is 
a chance that these cheap, easy attacks will cause real damage at least 
to a negligent CI and should thus be considered an enhanced threat.  
 The prospect of cyber attacks on CIs also broadens the pool of po-
tential attackers, again enhancing the threat. Unlike many physical 
attacks, cyber attacks will not immediately threaten the life of the at-
tacker when carried out remotely. Therefore, cyber terrorists are less 
restricted than terrorists in the kinetic world and can attack multiple 
targets. Cyber attacks might attract an entirely new set of adversaries; 
rather than driven terrorists, they might be launched by teenage hack-
ers who might be strongly deterred by attacking armed guards but lack 
such hesitation in their parents’ basement. 
 Law enforcement faces a variety of enforcement difficulties, partic-
ularly in locating the online criminal. Cyber attacks can occur beyond 
the sovereignty of the state, so the culprit does not need to escape and 
thus has fewer risks. Cyber attacks also raise an ‘attribution prob-
lem.’26 Attackers use digital technology to cover their tracks or even 
                                                                                                                  
 23. Michael B. Kelley, The Stuxnet Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was ‘Far More 
Dangerous’ Than Previously Thought, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:58 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-
2013-11?IR=T [https://perma.cc/X5QZ-S5FZ]. 
 24. See Bruce Schneier, The Story Behind the Stuxnet Virus, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/iran-nuclear-computer-technology-security-stuxnet-
worm.html [https://perma.cc/H4EY-5FK5]. 
 25. See Solce, supra note 20, at 307-09 (listing vulnerabilities in the “cyber battlefield”). 
 26. COMPUT. SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY 
TODAY AND TOMORROW: PAY NOW OR PAY LATER 4 n.9 (2002), http://citadel-infor-
mation.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/cybersecurity-today-and-tomorrow-pay-now-or-
pay-later-national-research-council-2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7HT-LFLG] (“Tracing at-
tacks is generally difficult, because serious attackers are likely to launder their connections 
to the target. That is, an attacker will compromise some intermediate targets whose vulner-
abilities are easy to find and exploit, and use them to launch more serious attacks on  
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implant false and deceptive identification marks. In many instances, 
the attacker’s true identity is protected because she used a public or 
‘zombie’ computer belonging to another.27 All of these elements mini-
mize the chances of attackers getting caught, thus improving the attack-
ers’ capabilities to attack and enhancing the threat of their actions. 
 The cyber realm also enhances the accessibility of threatening tools 
and measures. Equipped with the correct set of skills, almost anyone, 
from any place, can execute an attack, using even public computers. 
Contrast this with physical attacks, which usually require purchasing 
or concocting explosives or other weapons, which are not as widely 
available as computers. Furthermore, digital weapons can usually be 
purchased on black markets28 and attacks ordered via more secured 
communications. Cyber conditions therefore increase the set of poten-
tial attackers and thus the threats they generate.  
 Difficulty of Detection and Consequences. As is previously noted, 
cyber attacks are often difficult and expensive to detect and attribute to 
one specific attacker. These factors render such attacks more dangerous, 
as their outcomes could be dire for several reasons. Cyber attacks—as 
opposed to kinetic destruction—could remain undetected for an exten-
sive period of time.29 The passage of time allows the attacker to cause 
even greater harm.30 Furthermore, when intrusion into the CI remains 
undetected, the attacker can execute the attack at any time—usually 
the point at which the greatest damage will be caused. Finally, the at-
tack might never be detected if the damage and disruption it caused is 
                                                                                                                  
the ultimate intended target.”). For more on the attribution problem, see, e.g., David D.  
Clark & Susan Landau, Essay, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 323, 326 
(2011); Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can it Exist?, 64 A.F.L. REV. 1, 31 
(2009) (arguing that it might be difficult to attribute cyber attacks without the assistance of 
the country of origin); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Ef-
fects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2010); Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, 
State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 984-93 (2011).  
 27. A good example is a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, in which a virus 
compromises an end user computer and the attacker hijacks their computer to flood a target 
with too much data for it to handle. Therefore, the target views the end-user as the attacker, 
while the true attacker controls the end user’s actions. For more on DDoS attacks and legal 
responsibility, see Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How 
to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23 (2006). 
 28. See Solce, supra note 20, at 307 (mentioning the existence of “black market[s]” 
which sell information on computer vulnerabilities in the “cyber battlefield”). 
 29. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT., CRITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURES 18 (1997), http://chnm.gmu.edu/ 
cipdigitalarchive/files/5_CriticalFoundationsPCCIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QR5-AXFJ] 
(“Computer intrusions do not announce their presence the way a bomb does. . . . It sometimes 
takes months, even years, to determine the significance of individual computer attacks.”). 
 30. An example is the usage of the previously mentioned computer worm “Stuxnet,” 
which took a long time to discover. See Kelley, supra note 23. 
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attributed to a malfunction. This oversight allows the attackers to re-
peat their actions at a later time, causing even greater harm.  
 To summarize this Section, we note that the cyber era brought 
about many improvements and benefits to CIs. But at the same time, 
this era requires reassessing the management and defense of CIs. 
Cyber attacks can be simple to execute, quick, anonymous, accessible, 
and more affordable than physical attacks. Their implications can be 
more profound than physical attacks. What some commentators refer 
to as a “cyber” or “electronic Pearl Harbor”31 could have devastating 
consequences on the economy of any nation and its citizens.32 
Therefore, the regulation of such risks—on a practical, strategic, and 
theoretical level—must be reconsidered. 
III.   APPROACHES TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
A.   The U.S. Approach 
1.   The Rule: Limited Intervention 
 The United States has been responding to and regulating cyber 
risks to CIs for over two decades. The U.S. strategy shows a clear di-
rection—one of limited intervention in the action of private CIs. Sev-
eral very different administrations—each faced with varied challenges 
and external events—have embraced this strategy, even after numer-
ous chances to amend it. Nonetheless, more layers have been added to 
the regulation over the past few years, which have allowed for more 
meaningful guidance from government as well as facilitated infor-
mation sharing regarding this complex threat. This Article uses a 
chronological review (rather than a grouping of similar issues) to con-
vey a sense of how these matters have dynamically unfolded.33  
 The Clinton Administration—Acknowledgment and Foundations: 
The United States first acknowledged the importance of protecting CIs 
in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, but its 
                                                                                                                  
 31. MYRIAM DUNN CAVELTY, CYBER-SECURITY AND THREAT POLITICS: US EFFORTS TO 
SECURE THE INFORMATION AGE 91 (2008); see also Seven Questions: Richard Clarke on the 
Next Cyber Pearl Harbor, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 2, 2008), http://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2008/04/02/seven-questions-richard-clarke-on-the-next-cyber-pearl-harbor/ 
[https://perma.cc/6UCZ-G2KH].  
 32. See, e.g., William C. Banks & Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Symposium, Introduc-
tion, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 7, 9-11 (2010); Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating 
Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1503, 1505 (2013). 
 33. For a similar review method, see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Creating a “Circle 
of Trust” to Further Digital Privacy and Cybersecurity Goals, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1475,  
1520-23 (2014). 
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response was measured.34 President Clinton created an inter-agency 
Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG) to study the infrastruc-
tural vulnerabilities of the United States and provide recommenda-
tions. CIWG’s recommendations, announced in March 1996,35 led to 
the formation of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996.36 PCCIP released a report in October 
199737 finding “no immediate crisis threatening the nation’s infra-
structures,” but simultaneously finding reason to take action on cyber-
security.38 Eventually, in May 1998, the PCCIP’s report led to two 
Presidential Decision Directives: PDD-62 and PDD-63.39 
 PDD-63 identified the importance of increasing public awareness of 
critical infrastructure and named achieving protection of the nation’s 
CIs by the year 2003 as a national goal.40 To accomplish this, PDD-63 
identified which services needed protection41 and determined which 
federal agencies would take the lead in four government functions: “in-
ternal security and federal law enforcement; foreign intelligence; for-
eign affairs; and national defense.”42 Lead agencies were responsible 
for coordinating cooperation with private sector organizations, which 
were encouraged to collaborate. The Presidential Decision Directives 
also established new federal entities—notably, the National Infra-
                                                                                                                  
 34. CAVELTY, supra note 31, at 91; Eric A. Greenwald, History Repeats Itself: The 60-
Day Cyberspace Policy Review in Context, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 41, 43 (2010). 
 35. The working group made two proposals: First, to create “a full-time Task Force in 
the Executive Office of the President to study infrastructure assurance issues and recom-
mend national policy.” Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., to Robert E. Rubin, Sec’y 
of the Treasury, et al. (Mar. 14, 1996) (http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/munromem.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6AZ9-APLK]) (memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security). Second, 
to establish “a single interagency coordinating group within the Department of Justice, 
chaired by the FBI, to handle the interim infrastructure assurance mission with regard to both 
physical and cyber threats and to coordinate the work of the government in this area.” Id. 
 36. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996). 
 37. PRESIDENT’S COMM'N ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT., supra note 29. 
 38. MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 3. 
 39. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROTECTION AGAINST UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS 
TO THE HOMELAND AND AMERICANS OVERSEAS: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-62 
(1998); CLINTON POLICY, supra note 7; see also CAVELTY, supra note 31, at 91. 
 40. See CLINTON POLICY, supra note 7, at 2; MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 4. 
 41. “[I]nformation and communications; banking and finance; water supply; aviation, 
highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law en-
forcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public health 
services; electric power; oil and gas production, and storage.” MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 4 
(citing CLINTON POLICY, supra note 7, at 10). 
 42. Id. (citing CLINTON POLICY, supra note 7, at 10). 
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structure Advisory Council (NIAC), the National Infrastructure Pro-
tection Center (NIPC), and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance  
Office (CIAO).43  
 The Bush Administration—Institution Building: In the aftermath 
of 9/11, the organizational framework of agencies and institutions re-
sponsible for protecting CIs was somewhat revised, yet the overall 
strategy remained constant. The main change during this time was 
the establishment of new institutions. On October 8, 2001, President 
Bush signed Executive Order 13,228, establishing the Office of Home-
land Security44 and the Homeland Security Council.45 On October 16, 
2001, he signed Executive Order 13,231, which created the President’s 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the National Infrastruc-
ture Advisory Council.46  
 In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), to which many of the above-noted responsibilities related to the 
protection of CIs eventually gravitated.47 The Secretary of Homeland 
Security replaced the National Coordinator as the nation’s cyber coor-
dinator.48 In addition, many agencies and offices—including the Na-
tional Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the Critical Infra-
structure Assurance Office (CIAO)—were incorporated into the DHS.49 
                                                                                                                  
 43. NIAC was created to “provide the President through the Secretary of Homeland 
Security with advice on the security of the critical infrastructure sectors and their infor-
mation systems.” National Infrastructure Advisory Council, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/53ZX-L528]. 
NIPC was created to “serve as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, 
vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response entity,” CLINTON POLICY, su-
pra note 7, at 12, and received operational responsibilities and was located within the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Greenwald, supra note 34, at 49. CIAO was formed in 
the Department of Commerce, designed “to coordinate the development of a public-private 
partnership . . . . ” Id. 
 44. The Office of Homeland Security was tasked “to develop and coordinate the imple-
mentation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks.” Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001); MOTEFF, 
supra note 12, at 8 (citation omitted). 
 45. MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 8-9.  
 46. Exec. Order. No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (Oct. 18, 2001). The President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board “was authorized to ‘recommend policies and coordinate pro-
grams for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure.’ ” MOTEFF, supra note 
12, at 9 (citation omitted). The National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s main task was to 
advise the President “on the security of information systems for critical infrastructure.” Id. 
 47. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 48. Greenwald, supra note 34, at 49. 
 49. Id. at 50. The Act also transferred other agencies and offices which are related to 
critical infrastructure protection, e.g., the Federal Computer Incident Response Center 
(FedCIRC), the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), and the 
National Communication System (NCS). See § 201, 116 Stat. at 2148-49. 
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Substantively, the DHS Act granted legal protections, such as Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions, to non-federal entities that 
voluntarily provided information to the DHS.50 
 The Homeland Security Act also called for the initiation of a critical 
infrastructure protection program.51 Accordingly, in February 2003, 
the White House released its National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
(NSSC).52 The NSSC acknowledged the importance of protecting the 
nation’s CIs, but nonetheless made it clear that the federal govern-
ment was not, nor would it be, responsible for securing private  
computer networks.53 
 Following the release of the NSSC, the White House issued Home-
land Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)—Critical Infrastruc-
ture Identification, Prioritization and Protection on December 17, 
2003.54 Inter alia,55 HSPD-7 established the Critical Infrastructure 
                                                                                                                  
 50. The Homeland Security Act provides protection to critical infrastructure information 
that is “voluntarily submitted to a covered Federal agency for use by that agency regarding the 
security of critical infrastructure and protected systems, analysis, warning, interdependency 
study, recovery, reconstitution, or other informational purpose . . . .” § 214(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 
2152. These non-federal entities are exempt from disclosure. Specifically, under the Freedom 
of Information Act these entities “shall not be subject to any agency rules or judicial doctrine 
regarding ex parte communications with a decision making official” and are exempt from re-
quirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Id. § 214(a)(1)(B), (b), 116 Stat. at 2152-53. 
For an analysis of critical infrastructure protection in light of the Freedom of Information Act, 
see Cara Muroff, Note, Terrorists and Tennis Courts: How Legal Interpretations of the Free-
dom of Information Act and New Laws Enacted to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Will Shape the 
Public’s Ability to Access Critical Infrastructure Information, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 
(2005); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing 
the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. 
U.L. REV. 261 (2003). 
 51. § 213, 116 Stat. at 2152 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 132 (2012)). 
 52. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 
(2003), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4A2W-5QH8]; Jensen, supra note 26, at 1558. 
 53. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 52, at 11 (“The federal government 
could not—and, indeed, should not—secure the computer networks of privately owned banks, 
energy companies, transportation firms, and other parts of the private sector.”). 
 54. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7—Critical Infrastructure Identifica-
tion, Prioritization, and Protection, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1739 (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-7]. 
 55. HSPD-7 stated, “It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of 
our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts that could: (a) 
cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a 
weapon of mass destruction; (b) impair Federal departments and agencies’ abilities to per-
form essential missions, or to ensure the public’s health and safety; (c) undermine State and 
local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public ser-
vices; (d) damage the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the econ-
omy and delivery of essential services; (e) have a negative effect on the economy through the 
cascading disruption of other critical infrastructure and key resources; or (f) undermine the 
public’s morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions.” Id. at 1740. 
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Protection Policy Coordinating Committee, which was tasked with ad-
vising the Homeland Security Council on infrastructure security56 and 
assigned critical infrastructure tasks to federal departments and agen-
cies, some of which were classified as Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) 
and made responsible for the protection of CIs.57 Each SSA contributed 
to the newly developed National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
under the auspices of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The first 
NIPP was released in 2006,58 and has been updated twice since: in 
2009 and 2013.59 The 2006 NIPP listed twelve CIs as assets of national 
importance60 and five categories of key assets.61 
 In 2006, consistent with Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act, 
the DHS formed a Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Coun-
cil (CIPAC) “to facilitate interaction between governmental entities 
and representatives from the community of critical infrastructure 
                                                                                                                  
 56. MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
 57. Specifically, the Department of Agriculture was in charge of “agriculture, food 
(meat, poultry, egg products);” Health and Human Services was in charge of “public health, 
healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, egg products);” the Environmental Protection 
Agency was in charge of “drinking water and water treatment systems;” the Department of 
Energy was in charge of “energy, including the production refining, storage, and distribution 
of oil and gas, and electric power except for commercial nuclear power facilities;” the Depart-
ment of the Treasury was in charge of “banking and finance;” the Department of the Interior 
was in charge of “national monuments and icons;” and the Department of Defense was in 
charge of “defense industrial base.” HSPD-7, supra note 54, at 1741. Each SSA is required 
to “(a) collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and local gov-
ernments, and the private sector, including with key persons and entities in their infrastruc-
ture sector; (b) conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector; and (c) encourage 
risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against 
critical infrastructure and key resources.” Id.  
 58. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2006), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan_noApps.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMW2-KU6F]. 
 59. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN: 
PARTNERING TO ENHANCE PROTECTION AND RESILIENCY (2009), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ7U-7JH7]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NIPP 
2013: PARTNERING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (2013), 
https://www.dhs gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20Critical% 
20Infrastructure%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HFY-FUD9] 
[hereinafter 2013 NIPP]. 
 60. The twelve identified critical infrastructure sectors in the United States by the 2006 
NIPP: (1) defense industrial base; (2) food and agriculture; (3) public health and health care; 
(4) emergency services; (5) energy; (6) transportation systems; (7) banking and finance; (8) 
information technology; (9) telecommunications; (10) drinking water and water systems; (11) 
chemicals; and (12) postal and shipping. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 58, at 3. 
 61. (1) National monuments and icons; (2) nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; (3) 
dams; (4) government facilities; and (5) commercial facilities. See id. 
530  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:515 
  
owners and operators.”62 Since then, DHS has continued to fund vari-
ous centers and offices, each charged with analyzing CI protection 
plans and measures.63 
 The Obama Administration—Data Sharing and (Very) Gentle 
Nudging: The Obama Administration ordered a reexamination of the 
U.S. CI protection strategy,64 which led to the publication of two policy 
papers: the Cyberspace Policy Review in 200965 and the International 
Strategy for Cyberspace in 2011.66 The reports again emphasized the 
importance of protecting CIs; in response, the Obama Administration 
formed the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to centralize U.S. 
cyber operations and secure dot-mil domains.67 Neither publication 
brought substantial changes to the overall strategy noted thus far.  
 The Obama Administration released Presidential Policy Directive 
21 (PPD-21) in February 2013, Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, which superseded HSPD-7.68 PPD-21 called for strengthen-
ing CI security and resilience by refining and clarifying the organiza-
tional relationships across the federal government, enabling effective 
information exchange (including real time data sharing), and imple-
menting integration and analysis capabilities to inform planning and 
                                                                                                                  
 62. Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/ 
M9U7-JX5Q]; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2145-49 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 121 (2012)).  
 63. For example: Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC); 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC); and Office of  
Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA). See, e.g., Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Anal-
ysis (OCIA), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-in-
frastructure-analysis [https://perma.cc/B7BJ-U8NT].  
 64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-432T, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY 
STRATEGY: KEY IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN THE NATION’S POSTURE 1, 4 
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09432t.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39Z-EKC3]; Scott J.  
Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric Cyber Peace? Analyzing the Role of Na-
tional Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing Global Cybersecurity 14 (Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/scott_shackelford/13 [https://perma.cc/7PZ6-VGU7]. 
 65. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A 
TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NLU-82NX]. 
 66. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: 
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6CQ-ZNT2]. 
 67. Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 64, at 14; U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM), U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/ 
Factsheet-View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/ [https://perma.cc/BG8E-APJH].  
 68. MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 11; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, 
Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [https://perma.cc/DWF6-4K9P]. 
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operational decisions regarding CIs.69 In addition to expanding public-
private information sharing, PPD-21 listed and identified sixteen CI 
sectors: chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical man-
ufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; emergency services; energy; 
financial services; food and agriculture; government facilities; 
healthcare and public health; information technology; nuclear reac-
tors, materials, and waste; transportation systems; and water and 
wastewater systems.70 Each sector is linked up with an SSA as the lead 
coordinator. NIPP 2013 was released shortly thereafter and updated 
the previous NIPP.71  
 Roughly around the same time, President Obama signed Executive 
Order 13,636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,72 which 
was designed to develop, promote, and incentivize a voluntary cyberse-
curity framework and collaboratively develop and implement risk-based 
approaches to cybersecurity to protect privacy and civil liberties.73 Ad-
ditional steps were also taken to promote voluntary CI frameworks. In 
February 2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) published a voluntary cybersecurity framework for all CI opera-
tors: Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.74 
It contains standards, guidelines, and practices to encourage CI protec-
tion, mainly through public-private partnerships.  
                                                                                                                  
 69. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 68. 
 70. Id. 
 71. More specifically, the 2013 NIPP “[e]levates security and resilience as the primary 
aim of critical infrastructure homeland security planning efforts; [u]pdates the critical infra-
structure risk management framework and addresses alignment to the National Prepared-
ness System, across the prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery mission 
areas; [f]ocuses on establishing a process to set critical infrastructure national priorities de-
termined jointly by the public and private sector; [i]ntegrates cyber and physical security 
and resilience efforts into an enterprise approach to risk management; [a]ffirms that critical 
infrastructure security and resilience efforts require international collaboration; [s]upports 
execution of the National Plan and achievement of the National Preparedness Goal at both 
the national and community levels, with focus on leveraging regional collaborative efforts; 
and [p]resents a detailed Call to Action with steps that will be undertaken, shaped by each 
sector’s priorities and in collaboration with critical infrastructure partners, to make progress 
toward security and resilience.” 2013 NIPP, supra note 59, at 4. 
 72. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 73. Id. 
 74. More specifically, NIST focuses on risk management processes as a best practice for 
CIP. The proposed framework consists of three ties: framework core, framework profile, and 
framework implementation. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR 
IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4-5 (2014), https://www.nist.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JV28-3KBL]. 
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 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Cybersecurity Enhance-
ment Act75 and expanded the NIST’s responsibilities to include sup-
porting the development of voluntary, industry-led standards and 
practices to reduce CI cyber risks.76 The Act also vested the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy with developing federal cybersecurity 
research and development plans. While the private sector was not sub-
ject to mandatory requirements, these instruments clearly signal the 
government’s expectations of the private sector.  
 Information sharing initiatives continued to unfold. In December 
2014, Congress passed the National Cybersecurity Protection Act 
(NCPA),77 which formed the National Cybersecurity and Communica-
tions Integration Center (NCCIC). This center is tasked with creating 
a platform for voluntary government and private sector information 
sharing regarding cybersecurity threats, incident response, and tech-
nical assistance. Subject to DHS discretion, this center could include 
representatives from federal agencies, state and local governments, 
and private sector CI owners and operators.78 
 In addition, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,691 on cy-
bersecurity information in February 2015.79 This order builds upon Ex-
ecutive Order 13,636 and PPD–21, and “strongly encourage[s]  
the . . . formation of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations 
(ISAOs).”80 NCCIC and ISAOs are to collaborate on information shar-
ing related to cybersecurity risks and threats, incident response, and 
strengthening information security systems.81 Executive Order 13,691 
determines that that information sharing must be conducted while 
simultaneously protecting the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, 
preserving business confidentiality, and protecting the shared infor-
mation, among other things.82 
 In December 2015, President Obama signed the Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, which included a provision titled the “Cybersecurity 
Act of 2015.”83 The first chapter of the Cybersecurity Act is largely 
based on a highly controversial bill, the Cyber Information Sharing 
                                                                                                                  
 75. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971. 
 76. § 101(b), 128 Stat. at 2972-73. 
 77. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066. 
 78. CONGRESS PASSES FOUR CYBERSECURITY BILLS, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 13, 2014), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-four-cybersecurity-bills [https://perma.cc/ 
ZQR2-HMCA]. 
 79. Exec. Order No. 13,691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9349 (Feb. 20, 2015). 
 80. Id. at 9349. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2244. 
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Act (CISA), which attracted substantial attention.84 For security pur-
poses, the Cybersecurity Act authorizes private entities to monitor 
their information systems, initiate defensive measures, and share 
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with other private sector 
entities and the government.85 The Act places some restrictions on in-
formation sharing to protect privacy interests,86 and mainly forms a 
framework for the voluntary sharing of cyber threats, with the DHS 
acting as a central hub. Accordingly, CI operators and other private 
sector entities can legally share a “cyber threat indicator”87 for a “cy-
bersecurity purpose.”88 In exchange, they are granted immunity from 
liability, provided antitrust protections, and are exempt from any re-
lated requests under FOIA.89 While the final version of this Act was 
controversial,90 it notably did not expand DHS’s authority to include 
regulation of CIs as proposed under the original CISA Bill.91 Under the 
Cybersecurity Act, the DHS ultimately functions as a mere infor-
                                                                                                                  
 84. See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015). For  
criticism on previous versions of CISA, see, e.g., Eldar Haber, The Cybersecurity  
Information Sharing Act (CISA), CYBER FORUM (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:27 PM), http://web-
law.haifa.ac.il/he/Research/ResearchCenters/cyberforum/cyberblog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=20 
[https://perma.cc/A2MX-H6GX]; Sam Thielman, Controversial Cybersecurity Bill on Hold 
as Experts Charge It Won’t Stop Hackers, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2015), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/05/cybersecurity-cisa-bill-hackers-privacy-surveillance 
[https://perma.cc/32BQ-7JUD]. 
 85. See § 104, 129 Stat. at 2940-41. 
 86. For example, prior to information sharing, the network operator must remove “any 
information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat” that the operator “knows at the 
time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual or information that iden-
tifies a specific individual.” Id. § 104(d)(2)(A), 129 Stat. at 2942. 
 87. The term “cyber threat indicator” is defined as “information that is necessary to 
describe or identify” any of the following items or any combination of them: 
[M]alicious reconnaissance . . . ; a method of defeating a security control or ex-
ploitation of a security vulnerability; a security vulnerability . . . ; a method of 
causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information 
that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to unwit-
tingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security vulner-
ability; malicious cyber command and control; the actual or potential harm 
caused by an incident . . . ; [or] any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if 
disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law. 
See id. § 102(6)(A)-(G), 129 Stat. at 2937. 
 88. Id. § 102(4), 129 Stat. at 2936. 
 89. Id. § 106(b), 129 Stat. at 2951 (liability immunity); id. § 104(e), 129 Stat. at 2943 
(antitrust protections); id. § 104(d)(4)(B)(ii), 129 Stat. at 2942-43 (FOIA exemption). 
 90. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, How Does the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Change the Internet 
Surveillance Laws?, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/24/how-does-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-change-the-inter-
net-surveillance-laws [https://perma.cc/TV46-R7ZQ]. There are also bills calling for the re-
peal of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. See, e.g., H.R. 4350, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 91. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. § 407 (2015). 
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mation hub. It is also tasked with publishing (1) guidelines for report-
ing cyber threats; (2) procedures that governmental agencies must fol-
low for handling data received through this mechanism; and (3) a set 
of interim privacy and civil liberties guidelines governing the receipt, 
retention, use, and dissemination of data by federal entities.92 The Act 
does not constitute a substantial change in U.S. CI policy as it has 
unfolded in recent decades. There are currently several proposed bills 
that relate to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and could ex-
pand the framework for information sharing between CI operators and 
the government.93 
2.   The Exception—Direct Governmental Intervention 
 In general, the United States supports voluntary participation in CI 
protection policies. There are, however, two notable and substantial ex-
ceptions: U.S. chemical and energy sectors are subject to various forms 
of aggressive regulation, including mandatory government-set stand-
ards.94 Understanding these exceptions is of great importance, as either 
their universal or selective expansion is something to be considered.  
 In 2007, Congress enacted CI regulation within a specific sector: 
high-risk chemical facilities. Under the Homeland Security Appropri-
ations Act, Congress mandated the establishment of “risk-based per-
formance standards for security of chemical facilities,” the develop-
ment of vulnerability assessments, and “implementation of site secu-
rity plans for chemical facilities.”95 Note that even this regulatory 
scheme does not call for promulgation of specific rules; instead, it re-
quires general and broad standards to be determined by the DHS. A 
                                                                                                                  
 92. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 105, 129 Stat. 
2242, 2943-50. 
 93. See, e.g., Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. 
(2012). The Protecting Cyber Networks Act—approved by the U.S. House of Representa-
tives—sets a framework for private companies to provide information on any suspicious 
activity on their networks in exchange to immunity from consumer lawsuits. See Protect-
ing Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. § 203 (2015). Under the Act, the NCCIC 
serves as “the lead federal civilian interface for multi-directional and cross-sector  
sharing of information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures,  
and cybersecurity risks for federal and non-federal entities.” H.R.1560—Protecting  
Cyber Networks Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/1560 [https://perma.cc/24WV-7796]. 
 94. Notably, CI operators that facilitate in U.S. ports are subject to the Maritime Trans-
portation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, which “requires facilities 
at ports, and certain vessels, to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop and imple-
ment security plans . . . .” MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 30. 
 95. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550, 
120 Stat. 1355, 1388. 
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2014 amendment to this Act granted the federal government addi-
tional regulatory measures, including those related to its enforcement 
via civil penalties and orders to cease operations when needed.96  
 Since 2007, the energy sector has also been subject to mandatory 
requirements pertaining to cyber protection for its CI operators. Au-
thorized by the Energy Policy Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC)97 certified the North American Electric Reliabil-
ity Corporation (NERC)—which is not a governmental entity—as an 
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). NERC was tasked with devel-
oping, auditing for compliance, and enforcing mandatory reliability 
standards for bulk power systems, subject to FERC approval.98 Since 
its mandate, FERC has approved four CIP Reliability Standards.99  
 The noted regulatory dynamic, which involves both public and pri-
vate parties, constitutes an interesting form of co-regulation that has 
been subject to ongoing criticism in various forms. For one, commen-
tators argue that the FERC (the government entity) is unable to carry 
out its duties properly.100 Others claim that the results of the FERC’s 
approval process highly favor industry objectives.101 An additional cri-
tique set forth by the FERC itself notes that the process is excessively 
transparent (thus providing adversaries with extensive information 
                                                                                                                  
 96. See Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014, 
Pub. L. No. 113-254, § 2104, 128 Stat. 2898, 2912-13. 
 97. Since 2005, the FREC regulates “over 1,500 organizations, including municipal utili-
ties, Federal power administrations, electric cooperatives, and even the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.” Susan J. Court, Federal Cyber-Security Law 
and Policy: The Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 437, 438 
(2014); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FACT SHEET: ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 (2006), 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/epact-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/P363-SRUY].  
 98. See, e.g., Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Order No. 706-C, 127 FERC ¶ 61,273 (June 18, 2009); Mandatory Reliability Standards for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, Order No. 706-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,229 (Mar. 19, 2009); 
Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Order No. 706-A, 123 
FERC ¶ 61,174 (May 16, 2008); Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Order No. 706, 122 FERC ¶ 61,040 (Jan. 18, 2008); Dan Assaf, Models of Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection, 1 INT’L J. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 6, 
7-8 (2008). 
 99. See Ryan Ellis, Regulating Cybersecurity: Institutional Learning or a Lesson in Fu-
tility?, 12 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 48, 48 (2014); Version 5 Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion Reliability Standards, Order No. 791, 145 FERC ¶ 61,160 (Nov. 22, 2013). Indeed, there 
were actually five plans suggested, but one was never approved. See Court, supra note 97, 
at 443-44. 
 100. Court, supra note 97, at 454 (discussing the FERC's difficulty in responding to cyber 
risks in a timely manner).  
 101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID 
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT KEY 
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 22-26 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/ 
314410.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYJ4-LH9K] (listing key challenges the electricity industry 
faces); see also Palmer, supra note 17, at 340-41.  
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regarding vulnerabilities) and rigid, both factors that undermine its ef-
fectiveness. In response to critiques, the FERC argues the solution is to 
expand its authority.102 On the other hand, at least one commentator103 
noted that even after acknowledging this regulatory scheme’s shortcom-
ings, it might prove to be an optimal solution to regulate CI cyber 
threats. The scheme might be slow, but it allows for a bottom-up process 
that incorporates the knowledge accumulated by the industry.104  
 Nuclear power plants are another energy sector that has also been 
closely regulated. The operation of such plants must meet specific 
standards of competence and activity that include, inter alia, the as-
sessment of their vulnerabilities to a variety of attacks and mandate 
the necessary actions to address their vulnerabilities. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for the regulation and 
enforcement of this industry.105 To do so, the NRC published a detailed 
‘Regulatory Guide’ to help firms meet the required standards.106 How-
ever, the plants’ adherence to the noted guide is voluntary and security 
measures can be met through alternative means.  
 This summary of the U.S. approach to CI cyber risk protection in-
dicates that the American strategy mostly relies on presidential direc-
tives, executive orders, legislation, guidelines, and agency policies in 
specific sectors. Furthermore, with several noted sector-specific excep-
tions, the U.S. approach mostly facilitates public-private information 
sharing and depends upon market forces. However, a final caveat is 
due. Even though the government does not mandate specific stand-
ards, the benefits of the implementation and enforcement of these 
standards cannot be easily ignored—for example, voluntary imple-
mentation of government-set guidelines could shield private CIs from 
governmental and public scrutiny and help rebut negligence claims 
in tort lawsuits, all which might render these standards effectively 
mandatory.107 Since this final assertion has yet to be tested in a 
court of law, at best it remains speculative.  
                                                                                                                  
 102. Court, supra note 97, at 454-55.  
 103. Ellis, supra note 99, at 52-54. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUCLEAR REACTORS, MATERIALS, AND WASTE SECTOR-
SPECIFIC PLAN: AN ANNEX TO THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN 2 (2010), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-nuclear-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/G894-YCTC]; 
MOTEFF, supra note 12, at 30. 
 106. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, REGULATORY GUIDE 5.71: CYBER SECURITY 
PROGRAMS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES (2010), https://scp.nrc.gov/slo/regguide571.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6AVJ-J4LY]. 
 107. According to Stewart Baker: “In the real world, these ‘voluntary’ standards will be 
quasi-mandatory, because companies that don’t meet them could face lawsuits after suffer-
ing a breach. They will also provide some liability protection for industry, since under tort 
law, following government standards is a good way to rebut claims of negligence.” See Mark 
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B.   Regulating Cyber-Risks of CI—A Comparative View 
 While the United States seems to be set (for the time being) on a 
specific regulatory trajectory, other nations facing very similar chal-
lenges have chosen a different approach, and still others are contem-
plating changing their traditional paths.  
 CI regulation in the European Union has been addressed both at 
the state and the union level. As was the case in the United States, 
external events acted as the regulatory trigger, most notably the Ma-
drid train bombings of 2004.108 Here too, the early response was in the 
form of institution building. The European Council first required the 
European Commission to prepare an overall program to protect Euro-
pean CIs.109 In addition, in that same year, the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) was established to prevent, ad-
dress, and respond to network and information security problems and 
advise member states on these matters.110 ENISA will prove to be a 
key player in the promotion of data sharing between CIs and govern-
ments as well as among CIs themselves.  
 The next step in EU regulation was far more concrete and included 
specific recommendations and directives. At first, in 2006, the Commis-
sion proposed a CIP Directive, which, among other things, embraced the 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP).111 
The directive was approved in 2008112 and mandated that EU members 
enact domestic legislation incorporating EPCIP standards. While the 
Directive marked an important step in EU CIP, it had a limited scope. 
                                                                                                                  
Clayton, Why Obama’s Executive Order on Cybersecurity Doesn’t Satisfy Most Experts, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0213/ 
Why-Obama-s-executive-order-on-cybersecurity-doesn-t-satisfy-most-experts 
[https://perma.cc/Q3JR-6GV8]; see also John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
Isn’t Really Voluntary, PIVOT POINT SEC.: INFO. SEC. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.pivot-
pointsecurity.com/risky-business/nist-cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.cc/QN98-MWGX]. 
 108. See March 11, 2004: Terrorists Bomb Trains in Madrid, HISTORY, http://www.his-
tory.com/this-day-in-history/terrorists-bomb-trains-in-madrid [https://perma.cc/P2EA-8QB3]. 
 109. See Asa Fritzon et al., Protecting Europe’s Critical Infrastructures: Problems and 
Prospects, 15 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 30, 32 (2007). A ‘Green Paper’ on these 
issues was also published in 2005. See Commission Green Paper on a European Programme 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection, at 2, COM (2005) 576 final (Nov. 17, 2005), http:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0576&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/44MF-NCDZ]. 
 110. Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2004 Establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency 2004 O.J. 
(L 77) 1, 2. 
 111. Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infra-
structure Protection, COM (2006) 786 final (Dec. 12, 2006). 
 112. Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Desig-
nation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their 
Protection, 2008 O.J. (L 345) 75, 75. 
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First, it only regulated two sectors: energy and transportation. In addi-
tion, as it only focused on EU infrastructures, it only applied to those 
infrastructures shared by at least two EU member states. In general, 
the Directive faced wide criticism, particularly in light of its failure to 
impose obligations on CI operators beyond reporting attacks.113 
 EU actions to this point did not address specific cyber challenges. 
Yet this was bound to change, and on March 30, 2009, the EU Com-
mission adopted the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
Communication.114 Among other things, this communication ad-
dressed the need to establish criteria for European CI protection in the 
field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).115 In 
March 2011, the Commission continued its efforts to enhance CIP and 
called for the creation of an EU coherent and cooperative approach 
that incorporated a global coordination strategy.116 Here again, the 
Commission emphasized the importance of ICT resilience, and on June 
12, 2012, the EU Parliament adopted a new CIP resolution that fo-
cused on ICT.117 This resolution proposed, inter alia, forming public 
and private stakeholders partnerships at the union level and encour-
aged them to develop and implement security standards to increase 
civilian national and European critical information infrastructure re-
silience. Therefore, the EU experience has thus far been quite similar 
to that of the United States—its regulations mostly focused on facili-
tating data sharing, promoting voluntary standards developed by pub-
lic-private partnerships, and carving out sector-specific exceptions.  
 However, substantial changes in EU policy are on their way. In 
2016, the European Parliament adopted a new directive for CI cyber 
                                                                                                                  
 113. For criticism on the Directive, see Commission Staff Working Document on the Re-
view of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), at 12, SWD 
(2012) 190 final (June 22, 2012).  
 114. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection, “Protecting Europe from Large Scale Cyber-attacks and Disruptions: 
Enhancing Preparedness, Security and Resilience,” COM (2009) 149 final (Mar. 30, 2009). 
 115. Policy on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(July 2, 2013), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/policy-critical-information-infra-
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Information Infrastructure Protection, “Achievements and next Steps: Towards Global 
Cyber-security,” COM (2011) 163 final (Mar. 31, 2011). 
 117. European Parliament Resolution on Critical Information Infrastructure Protec-
tion—Achievements and Next Steps: Towards Global Cyber-security (2011/2284(INI)), 
P7_TA(2012)0237, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-
TA-2012-0237&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0167. 
2017]  CYBERSECURITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 539 
  
 
security.118 The directive “concerning measures to ensure a high com-
mon level of network and information security across the Union,”119 or 
the NIS Directive, includes several distinct steps. First, it moves to 
actively promote data sharing. For instance, the directive mandates 
that member states establish competent Network Information Secu-
rity (NIS) authorities to facilitate data sharing and cooperation, as 
well as Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). Next, it re-
quires states to plan and consider their responses to attacks on CIs by 
adopting national NIS strategies and NIS cooperation plans. And the 
directive extends beyond the confines of the current U.S. regulatory 
strategy; under Article 14, it mandates that CI operators (addressed 
and defined as “essential services”) generate a cyber risk assessment 
and apply appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure infor-
mation security. Even privately held CIs are required to report secu-
rity incidents to the government, and noncompliance will result in 
sanctions.120 A separate, more lenient regime was set in place in Article 
16 for “digital service providers,” which were defined to include search 
engines, cloud computing services, and online marketplaces.121 
 The European Union has an aggressive stance on creating a specific 
sector strategy for communication services. A 2009 amendment to the 
EU communication directive requires member states enact legislation 
regulating public communication networks, even if they are at times 
private entities.122 Accordingly, communication companies must take 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to manage security 
risks to their networks and services.123 The directive further mandates 
that member states promulgate legislation, requiring these firms to 
submit a security audit to a national authority and to permit  
mandatory inspection of their sites to ensure that appropriate measures  
were implemented. 
                                                                                                                  
 118. European Comm’n—Fact Sheet: Directive on Security of Network and Information 
Systems (July 6, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2422_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LF7M-ZZY4]. 
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Union, COM (2013) 48 final (Feb. 7, 2013). 
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 122. Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Novem-
ber 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37, 54. 
 123. Id. arts. 13a, 13b, at 54-55. 
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 Beyond EU regulation, EU Member States have deployed inde-
pendent and diverse measures to protect CIs from cyber attacks.124 
Some chose a more lenient approach, others a far stricter one. For in-
stance, in the UK,125 CI operators can choose whether to receive advice 
from a governmental authority, the National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC),126 which is similar to the voluntary scheme applied in the 
United States. Other EU states enacted regulatory schemes that in-
clude government oversight. For instance, the Czech Republic recently 
passed cybersecurity legislation that specifies CIP operator require-
ments.127 Furthermore, the Czech National Security Authority was 
empowered with discretionary authority to take reactive measures to 
resolve cybersecurity incidents or to secure information systems and 
networks.128 Germany had generally implemented voluntary infra-
structure protection measures with few legal requirements. Yet re-
cently this changed when Germany created a CIP Implementation 
Plan, termed “KRITIS,” with the declared goal of encouraging public-
private information sharing and cooperation.129 Furthermore, even 
more recently, Germany chose a stricter approach by passing a new 
law requiring CI operators introduce cybersecurity measures or face 
fines of up to € 100,000 (in addition to strict reporting requirements of 
cyber attacks).130 The new Czech and German strategies seem to 
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acknowledge the novel cyber risks to CI stability and chose to respond 
to these risks by enhancing government regulatory reach. 
 Other countries have already established such an elaborate regula-
tory scheme. A case in point, consider Israel’s regulatory scheme. 
Clearly, Israel faces a multitude of threats both in the physical and 
cyber worlds. It is therefore no surprise that it has closely regulated 
CI cyber security131 and chosen a strict and unique government ap-
proach to protecting CIs. The Israeli Security Law (2002 amendment) 
established the National Information Security Authority (NISA) (a 
unit within the General Security Service).132 NISA was “charged with 
[the] professional guidance of the institutions under its responsibility 
in the area of protecting critical computer infrastructures.”133 The Is-
raeli legislation also features a list of CIs that are subject to NISA au-
thority.134 Inclusion in the CI list is not sectorial; rather it is an ad hoc 
list of specific bodies that are subject to the regulatory scheme. 
 The official role of the NISA135 is to guide, oversee implementation, 
and sanction for noncompliance.136 All CI-defined companies must ap-
point a chief security officer, who is responsible for essential computer 
system security, subject to NISA approval and guidelines. NISA is also 
empowered to direct and instruct the chief security officer on required 
security actions (including reporting) and, most importantly, to inspect 
the regulated entity. Very recent changes in Israeli law are shifting 
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 135. The Israeli government is currently leading an effort to transfer most of NISA responsi-
bilities to the newly formed Cyber Bureau. See Advancing National Cyberspace Capabilities, Isr. 
Res. No. 3611 (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/PrimeMinistersOffice/Division-
sAndAuthorities/cyber/Documents/Advancing%20National%20Cyberspace%20Capabilities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9Q4B-J5NB]; see also Daniel Benoliel, Towards a Cybersecurity Policy Model: 
Israel National Cyber Bureau Case Study, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 435, 445 (2015) (exploring the 
tasks of the Israeli National Cyber Bureau).  
 136. Tabansky, supra note 133, at 72 (describing the Israeli CIP model). 
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some of these responsibilities and authorities to a newly-minted Cyber 
Authority, which is part of the Prime Minister’s Office.137  
 To conclude this brief comparative study, the European Union’s ap-
proach to cyber CIP is relatively non-intrusive. The European Union 
acknowledges the importance of a national CIP agency; information 
sharing between member states; and forming mandatory advisory and 
oversight frameworks. However, this approach is relatively moderate 
(in comparison, for instance, to Israel’s). Perhaps future developments, 
such as those currently under discussion in the European Union and 
specific member states, will change current CIP strategies. Several EU 
states have already taken steps in this direction. 
IV.   MODELS OF CYBER CIP: MARKET-BASED & EX POST REGULATION 
 As our comparative analysis demonstrates, the current U.S. CI 
cyber risk regulatory strategy is premised on voluntary participation. 
Yet this strategy should at least be revisited (if not revised) given both 
the transitions in the risk profile of cyber events and regulatory 
changes being considered in other countries. Optimal regulatory 
schemes must carefully balance costs, benefits, and challenges of var-
ious regulatory models. This Part seeks out such an optimal scheme, 
and commences the discussion in Section A by first examining a regu-
latory regime that features the most minimal level of regulation and 
is almost solely governed by market forces. To some extent, this is the 
current U.S. regime. Section A then proceeds to identify this regime’s 
systematic failures and shortcomings. Thereafter, in Sections B and C 
this discussion moves to analyze more demanding regulatory schemes, 
which feature enhanced information sharing and ex post liability for 
damages caused by security failures, all the while accounting for the 
specific context of cyber CIs.  
A.   The Market-Based Approach 
 To establish whether CIP necessitates regulatory intervention, we 
must determine whether social and market forces are able to generate 
an equilibrium according to which firms provide adequate CIP on their 
own initiative and with their own resources. Private CI entities have 
substantial incentives to provide high levels of protection and they in-
deed invest in measures to protect their firm’s assets (both physical 
and virtual), its reputation and share price, and its customers from 
harm. This is because interrupted and discontinued services would 
                                                                                                                  
 137. Law for the Regulation of Security in Public Bodies, 5758-1998, SH No. 1739 §§ 2a, 
10 (Isr.); see also Assaf, supra note 98, at 8-9. 
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likely increase consumer dissatisfaction, leading to reduced consump-
tion or even termination of the contract.138 If this is the case, limited 
or no government regulation could prove to be the optimal strategy. 
According to this line of thought, regulatory intervention is needed 
only when market failures are identified and prevent the market from 
reaching an acceptable equilibrium point. Market failures are the in-
stance at which CIs require external intervention to assure a suitable 
level of protection. 
 The ‘market will solve it’ argument might seem to be an analytical 
‘straw man,’ especially when pertaining to the market for public utili-
ties, which are often regulated closely and feature multiple systematic 
failures. Yet this argument cannot be easily rejected for at least two 
reasons. First, to a great extent this argument constitutes the self-pro-
claimed regulatory strategy in the United States today and, therefore, 
must be given some additional thought.139 Second, even though the 
outcome of this limited regulatory scheme is problem-ridden, it still 
features notable benefits. It reduces regulatory costs associated with 
both norm-setting and complex enforcement, which could prove sub-
stantial in this hi-tech context. It limits fears and problems associated 
with regulatory capture and could also reduce potential systematic er-
rors found in governmental regulation. Arguably, private CI operators 
are in a better position than the government to determine which secu-
rity measures are required to protect their own infrastructures, espe-
cially concerning technological matters.140 Beyond economic benefits, 
limited governmental regulation generates social value. Lack of gov-
ernmental involvement decreases, and in some instances, eliminates, 
constitutional and human rights violations, especially those pertain-
ing to the right to privacy. Government meddling with security levels 
and alerts could quickly evolve into government data collection—a 
practice that generates substantial concerns. 
 Yet the claim that market and social forces alone are sufficient to 
ward off cyber risks to CIs faces very substantial challenges, because 
                                                                                                                  
 138. For similar arguments by industry representatives, see PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CYBER 
WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE 
WORLD 100-01 (2013); THERESE KERFOOT, CYBERSECURITY: TOWARDS A STRATEGY FOR SECURING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM CYBERATTACKS 6 (2012), http://siliconflatirons.org/ 
documents/publications/report/CybersecurityPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/E39V-6EFL]. 
 139. It seems like the market-based approach currently leads CIP regulation in the 
United States. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT 
TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 120-22 (2010). 
 140. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 17, at 297-98 (“[T]hose who oppose government man-
dates, particularly those in the critical infrastructure industry, believe the government lacks 
the understanding to regulate effectively across so many diverse sectors and believe man-
dates will impose high costs that will stifle market place innovation, ultimately leaving the 
nation even less secure.”). 
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the market and social forces CIs are subjected to generate insufficient 
incentives for CI owners and thus will not lead to optimal outcomes in 
this context.141 These challenges most likely will lead to insufficient 
investments in cyber protection142 and sub-optimal responses to un-
folding cyber threats. These outcomes result from three distinct causes 
that we now discuss separately: (1) Market failures and other barriers 
undermine CI customers’ abilities to signal their discontent with in-
sufficient levels of cyber protection, and therefore, the noted equilib-
rium will not be reached; (2) inadequate cyber-protection generates 
negative externalities. Market forces alone do not provide CI operators 
with sufficient incentives to internalize the costs and risks they might 
cause; and (3) CI operators lack inherent information and knowledge, 
which impedes their ability to provide a sufficient level of protection. 
Recognizing that each concern is distinct is crucial because, as set out 
below, each one requires a different response and relies on a separate 
set of facts and assumptions.  
 (1) Market Failures/Signaling Problems: In theory, firms respond 
to consumer discontent (or the fear of them being discontent enough to 
leave) and take action. Yet this dynamic will not unfold if consumers 
lack the ability or opportunity to indicate their discontent—for in-
stance, when a firm is a monopoly or operates in an oligopolistic mar-
ket. Additionally, in many instances markets feature high switching 
costs;143 that is, the high costs of changing service providers limit the 
consumers’ signaling abilities. Finally, the fear of a drop in stock prices 
due to security breaches does not appear to be substantial given mixed 
results found in the personal data breach context.144 
                                                                                                                  
 141. See, for example, a letter from the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command Keith Al-
exander to Senator John McCain. Letter from U.S. Army Commander Keith Alexander to 
Senator John McCain 1 (May 3, 2012), https://publicintelligence.net/u-s-cyber-command-cy-
bersecurity-legislation-position-letter [https://perma.cc/ERH7-FR76] (“Additionally, given 
DoD reliance on certain core critical infrastructure to execute its mission, as well as the 
importance of the Nation’s critical infrastructure to our national and economic security over-
all, legislation is also needed to ensure that infrastructure is efficiently hardened and resil-
ient. Recent events have shown that a purely voluntary and market driven system is not 
sufficient.”); see also Palmer, supra note 17, at 297 (arguing that voluntary efforts and mar-
ket forces might not lead to adequate security for critical infrastructure). 
 142. Sales, supra note 32, at 1511-1517; KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 5. Research con-
ducted by McAfee in 2010 and 2011 revealed that many privately-owned companies poorly in-
vest in cybersecurity, mainly due to financial reasons. While we acknowledge McAfee’s inter-
ests in the outcomes of such research, it still provides some insights on cybersecurity in the 
private sector. See STEWART BAKER ET AL., IN THE DARK: CRUCIAL INDUSTRIES CONFRONT 
CYBERATTACKS 1 (2011), http://www.mcafee.com/in/resources/reports/rp-critical-infrastruc-
ture-protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V5V-8JDP]; STEWART BAKER ET AL., IN THE CROSSFIRE: 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 13-15 (2010), http://img.en25.com/ 
Web/McAfee/CIP_report_final_uk_fnl_lores.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFE8-LS5S] [hereinafter 
BAKER ET AL., IN THE CROSS FIRE]. 
 143. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 6. 
 144. For a literature review of this matter, see Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach 
Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256, 264 (2011). 
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 CI markets often face the above-mentioned problems, which under-
mine effective signaling (and, in turn, could lead to suboptimal levels 
of cyber security). Private CI operators are often public utilities, which 
operate with limited, if any, competition. In addition, switching utility 
providers is often cumbersome, difficult, and rarely done.  
 In theory, consumers could also signal their discontent by limiting 
their usage and not just by switching. Yet this form of signaling is un-
likely to be effective. Consumers often consider the services provided 
by CI operators essential. Therefore, even after they acknowledge the 
risks of cyber attacks, consumers will not reduce their level of con-
sumption. The inelastic demand curve often pertaining to this form of 
consumption could lead to even harsher outcomes; not only will firms 
ignore consumer discontent, they will be indifferent to the costs that 
successful cyber attacks might entail. CI firms could easily recoup 
these additional expenses by raising prices (which, even if regulated, 
are often premised on a “cost+” calculation – a cost that would rise 
given the need to repair that attack's damages). Therefore, the market-
based argument fails to convince that the market alone will achieve 
necessary CI security.  
 It should be noted that this critique is somewhat context specific. 
For instance, not all CIs are monopolies. Wireless services, which 
surely fall in the CI category in today’s economy, are offered by several 
carriers in every geographical location, have multiple infrastructures, 
and feature relatively reasonable switching costs.145 In addition, mo-
nopolies are not fully immune from the consequences of cyber attacks. 
Service failure due to such attacks causes public outrage, ignites the 
press, and leads to political pressure and regulatory inquiries. All of 
these factors cause financial losses and even greater government in-
tervention in operations—outcomes that firms surely dread.146 There-
fore, even monopolies are incentivized to invest in cybersecurity 
measures.147 But such pressures are often insufficient.148  
 Yet another set of challenges impede the market and social dynam-
ics that might prompt firms to adopt proper protective measures—
                                                                                                                  
 145. The United States currently features four national carriers with separate networks 
(Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint) and a regional network (US Cellular) available at 
some locations. See Scott Webster & Jessica Dolcourt, Before You Switch Wireless Carriers, 
Read This, CNET (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:59 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/comparing-wireless-
carrier-plans-us [https://perma.cc/CRB6-V982]. 
 146. For further information on the social and political aspects of monopolies, see gener-
ally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).  
 147. It is plausible that a monopoly could be indifferent to costs since it can pay off these 
costs from its consumers, and thereby will not be deterred from overinvesting in cybersecurity. 
 148. Sales, supra note 32, at 1517 (“[S]trategically significant firms in uncompetitive 
markets are less likely to adequately invest in cyber-security than ordinary firms in  
competitive markets.”). 
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those related to asymmetric information. To engage in any form of the 
signaling dynamics noted above, consumers (or reporters or politi-
cians) require a variety of information—that is, information regarding 
the existence of cyber attacks, the (inadequate) levels of protection im-
plemented, and the damages caused. In most cases, such information 
is rarely available to anyone outside of the CI operator (below we ex-
amine whether even the CI operator itself holds sufficient knowledge 
on the subject).  
 Indeed, even while a CI operator’s failure is likely apparent, the 
causes for these failures, especially in the digital context, are not. Nat-
urally, companies are not keen on divulging such information; disclo-
sure could damage their reputation, scare off customers, and increase 
their legal liability.149 It might also improve the success of subsequent 
attacks.150 In addition, signals of high quality security measures that 
a responsible CI might consider conveying might be futile, as they are 
commonly distorted by other market players generating false signals151 
and therefore may eventually be disregarded by consumers. 
 Moreover, merely sharing information about attacks and defenses 
is insufficient. Many customers are not equipped to properly analyze 
its meaning. Therefore, if we endorse such a market-based approach 
as a measure to assure sufficient levels of cyber protection, we need to 
ensure not only that the information is distributed, but also that it  
is comprehensible.  
 (2) Negative Externalities: In many instances, the damage from a 
cyber attack, and the lack of appropriate defense measures, create neg-
ative externalities.152 This argument has two facets. First, while cyber-
related attacks create costs and direct losses for firms, they cause 
greater damage to others—such as their consumers—which firms re-
fuse to internalize, especially given the market failures previously dis-
cussed. Indeed, as noted, even though firms could recoup some ex-
penses from consumers, successful attacks will still prove costly to the 
firms: for example, damage to their infrastructures (digital, ICT, and 
other) and reputation and even increased exposure to possible law-
suits–all costs which they indeed internalize. However, because CIs 
provide vital services, consumers suffer additional extensive second-
ary damages due to the loss of service which firms do not  
necessarily internalize.  
                                                                                                                  
 149. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 162-63. 
 150. See infra note 158. 
 151. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1036 (2014) 
(demonstrating this claim while referring to the failure of TRUSTe to properly signal a high 
level of security) [hereinafter Bambauer, Ghost in the Network].  
 152. Negative externalities occur when the parties to a transaction do not internalize its 
cost and a third party bears it. See KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 12. 
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 A response to this obvious argument is that firms might indeed in-
ternalize consumer damage as well (including secondary damages), 
given the signaling dynamic noted above and the potential loss of busi-
ness and revenue. In other words, the threat of negative consumer sig-
nals resulting from CI security failures will sufficiently incentivize the 
CI to provide adequate protection and apply investments which are at 
least equal to the damages they caused their consumers. This re-
sponse, as explained above, is problematic given the prospect of mar-
ket failures. Yet even in markets that feature competitive CIs and low 
switching costs, an additional aspect of negative externalities must 
still be discussed. 
 The aggregate social harm of a successful CI cyber attack will most 
likely be higher than the aggregate harm to both the firm and its con-
sumers. This is due to the multi-sectoral effects of CI damage; harm to 
one CI can lead to harm to another CI, and even subsequently harm to 
the latter’s consumers as well. For instance, electrical shutdowns or 
communication failures could negatively impact many other CI opera-
tors (such as those providing water) and individuals (who cannot re-
ceive services from those without power or communications).153 In such 
cases, the primary CI will not internalize the negative impacts from 
successful cyber attacks and thus will not be properly incentivized to 
prevent them.154  
 With only partial incentives in place, it is clear that CIs will not 
voluntarily provide adequate protection since they lack the requisite 
incentives to allocate financial resources to proper and sufficient cy-
bersecurity measures. Furthermore, due to spillover effects, some com-
panies will fail to adopt sufficient security measures in order to limit 
positive externalities to other firms (possibly, their competitors) that 
will benefit from them and ‘free ride’ on their efforts. Instead, firms 
would rather attempt to ‘free ride’ on the investment of others, bene-
fiting from the ‘herd immunity’ resulting from their protective steps, 
or expect that any cybersecurity failings will be dispersed, and there-
fore, they will not be held accountable.155 
 (3) Information and Expertise Deficiencies: Suppose, for the mo-
ment, that firms are fully incentivized to meet optimal cyber-security 
standards and activities. Are they properly equipped to do so? 
 Arguably, CI operators possess the optimal level of information on 
their facilities, and accordingly, they should know how best to protect 
                                                                                                                  
 153. TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK, A NATION UNPREPARED, SURVIVING THE 
AFTERMATH (2015) (discussing in depth the risks of a cyber attack on the U.S. electric grid); 
ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 162-63. 
 154. For a similar argument, see Sales, supra note 32, at 1508.  
 155. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 6. 
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them.156 While this could be true generally, it is not necessarily the 
case in the cyber context. As noted, cyber attacks possess unique char-
acteristics—they can rapidly change their form and spread from one 
context to another.157 Therefore, the most relevant information on the 
nature and frequency of cyber attacks is likely to be found with a wide 
range of CI operators, rather than held by one single operator. As a 
result, a single firm that operates alone based on its own information 
is likely to choose a suboptimal strategy, or level of protection.158  
 However, before calling for governmental regulation, our analysis 
must still proceed as we have not yet pointed to an incurable failure that 
requires such intervention. Prima facie, CI operators should be capable 
and possess independent incentives to recognize such information defi-
ciencies are afoot and to act in concert to cure them. One such cure could 
be to establish joint networks for information sharing and notification 
of relevant alerts. If these joint ventures were to unfold, this information 
deficiency problem could be independently resolved.  
 However, there are serious concerns that such information defi-
ciency will not be independently resolved without an external boost or 
mandate. Fearing confidentiality issues by divulging trade secrets and 
business models, CI operators may refrain from information sharing 
with competitors (even if information sharing would be potentially 
beneficial for all parties,159 as each side could receive future warn-
ings).160 In other instances, companies may hesitate to share infor-
mation with other CIs, foreseeing possible antitrust violations.161 In 
addition, companies might fear civil litigation for privacy violations if 
personal consumer data is shared with other parties.162  
                                                                                                                  
 156. See George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. 
REV. ECON. 391, 397 (2014) (“Sellers also naturally know more about the products they mar-
ket than do consumers.”).  
 157. See supra Section II.B. 
 158. Note however, that some argue that information gaps are not crucial in protecting 
CI. See Derek E. Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 468 (2015) 
[hereinafter Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings]. 
 159. Cf. id. at 466 (arguing that information sharing is overrated in cybersecurity). 
 160. Many CI operators might act irrationally or with bounded rationality. As some CI 
operators do not possess all relevant information and/or fully understand it, they might rely 
on heuristics. Such heuristics could be helpful in many instances, but could also lead to un-
desired outcomes. See KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 11-12. For more on law and market be-
havior, see generally Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
573 (2014).  
 161. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2012); see also Palmer, supra note 17, at 319-23 
(describing the legal barriers for information sharing); KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 35-36 
(noting that information sharing schemes have failed due to antitrust concerns, and explain-
ing how this problem might be resolved).  
 162. See ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND 
INFORMATION SHARING: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 16 (2015), https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X7Z-Q824]. But cf. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, 
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 Therefore, regulatory intervention may be appropriate, if only to 
encourage or enable a trustworthy system of information sharing. The 
information deficiency problem could be exacerbated not only by a lack 
of information in general, but specifically by companies’ inability to 
receive information in a timely manner when executed voluntarily. As 
an attack on one CI might be a precursor of an imminent attack on 
another, external measures might be required to facilitate the speedy 
transfer of data in real time.  
 In addition to information deficiencies, private CI firms may lack 
the expertise required to properly evaluate cyber attack risks or im-
plement necessary security measures and thus be unequipped to re-
spond to cyber risks. In this specific context, the state arguably has an 
advantage and is perhaps in the best position to advise CIs. 
 Again, this argument is counterintuitive: seemingly, CI operators 
should be in the best position to possess (or at least, acquire) 
knowledge on how to run their own operations. Here again, the cyber 
context leads to unique outcomes. CI operators often fail to obtain this 
knowledge as it is highly technical, specific, and possibly linked to 
other government-related activities. It is often outside the scope of reg-
ular CI operator activities. To illustrate, note that even Google, at least 
in some instances of cyber attacks, has reportedly requested the assis-
tance of governmental agencies.163 If this is true of tech-savvy firms 
such as Google, it likely applies to CI operators at the low-tech end.  
 Thus far, we have presented several arguments regarding market 
failures and other impediments that potentially prevent CI operators 
from optimizing their defenses against cyber attacks. To resolve such 
challenges, we offer several possible courses of action. In the next Part, 
we begin by proposing modest solutions that feature limited interven-
tion while maintaining a market-based approach to the challenges of 
protecting CI from cyber risks. To some extent, this analysis explains 
the rationale behind recent steps taken in the United States and else-
where to promote CIP. However, as we further show, a limited approach 
is not an optimal strategy to promote CI sustainability and security. 
B.   Limited Intervention via Disclosure Requirements and  
Information Sharing  
 As previously mentioned, a lack in information creates a substan-
tial barrier to optimal market-based cybersecurity. This gap has two 
                                                                                                                  
at 168 (doubting that such issue presents real difficulties to companies); Bambauer, Sharing 
Shortcomings, supra note 158, at 469-72 (rejecting assumption that legal liability impedes 
companies from sharing data). 
 163. As Paul Rosenzweig describes, when Google encountered a cyber-attack, they ap-
proached the National Security Agency (NSA) to aid them. See ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, 
at 158. 
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prongs: one pertaining to those outside the firm who fail to understand 
the risks the firm’s responses (or lack thereof) to cyber threats create, 
and the other pertaining to the firm itself and its inability to properly 
respond to attacks given insufficient information and expertise. Vari-
ous policy strategies could be (and in some contexts, have already 
been) implemented to eliminate these barriers. If successful, market-
based solutions that only call for limited intervention could still prevail 
(assuming that the other concerns noted above are addressed as well—
an issue we discuss in subpart C). As we now explain, this is easier 
said than done.  
1.   Bridging the Information Gap: Disclosure Requirements to 
Consumers 
 A simple response to the fear of insufficient political and social sig-
naling by the public, in light of CI cyber failures, due to the public’s 
lack of proper information and understanding of related issues, would 
be to enhance disclosure via mandatory disclosure rules. This require-
ment is closely related to the broadening theme of ‘disclosure regula-
tion,’164 which has been established in a variety of contexts. On its face, 
the notion of establishing such disclosure rules could hardly be con-
tested, as it echoes similar requirements in the related context of se-
curing personal information.165 In this latter context, when learning of 
a personal data breach, businesses are required to notify those poten-
tially affected by it (such as those to whom the personal data per-
tained).166 Similarly, in the CIP context, it may be wise to establish 
disclosure regulations for CI operators. These disclosures would apply 
to cyber attacks attaining a certain degree of success. For instance, 
regulators could oblige CI operators to notify their customers of any 
damage to their infrastructure or of any service disruption cause by a 
cyber attack.  
 While this solution seems both relatively harmless and easy to im-
plement, it is unclear whether such steps are wise. Disclosure could 
                                                                                                                  
 164. Cass Sunstein articulated the phrase “regulation through disclosure.” See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999).  
 165. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 920, 932-35 (2007). There are various explicit regulations for data 
security in the United States. For example, “[T]he Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) re-
quires financial institutions to develop procedures for protecting the security of customer 
data and empowers the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . and other bank regula-
tory agencies to promulgate data security regulations.” Id. at 920; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501, 505, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436-37, 1440-41 (1999) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805 (2012)). 
 166. See, for example, the first type of such regulation in California: CAL. CIV.  
CODE §§ 1798.28, .82, .84 (West 2016). 
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achieve very little and generate needless costs. Indeed, disclosure-
based regulations in general have been widely criticized,167 specifically 
regarding the high occurrence of such disclosures and their potential 
inaccuracies. Cyber attacks occur frequently, but their effects are often 
minimal and therefore the abundance of disclosures and notices might 
backfire. In addition, consumers could underestimate the scope of this 
problem due to a cognitive bias.168 With time, these notifications might 
be considered untrustworthy or unnecessary, and fail to receive proper 
attention, if any.169 In addition, mandatory disclosure mechanisms 
could leave serious shortcomings unreported, such as vulnerabilities 
that have not yet been abused. Therefore, disclosure regulations alone 
cannot bridge the existing information gaps between consumers and 
CI operators. 
 A different strategy could resolve these shortcomings. Instead of fo-
cusing on incidental damages, disclosure mechanisms could focus on 
risks. Hence, disclosure mechanisms could oblige CI operators to pub-
licly report security measurements and/or security test results.170 It 
would be a one-time form of disclosure, not spread over time or pro-
vided in a manner which could desensitize recipients.  
 However, this second disclosure model poses risks of its own. It 
does not resolve issues related to the possible underestimation  
of risks that have yet to materialize, and thus does not fully account  
for the importance of security measures.171 Yet more importantly,  
such reports could exacerbate the risks of cyber attacks because  
they divulge CI vulnerabilities.172 Therefore, even if such a model  
could potentially aid cybersecurity, it could also harm it; this  
model is consequentially suboptimal. 
                                                                                                                  
 167. See KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 18-19. 
 168. Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contract-
ing in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 313 
(2008); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232 (1989). 
 169. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 165, at 916; Fred H. Cate, Another Notice Isn’t An-
swer, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2005, 8:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opin-
ion/2005-02-27-consumer-protection-oppose_x.htm [https://perma.cc/NZ89-H97Y]. 
 170. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Army Commander Keith Alexander to Senator John 
McCain, supra note 141, at 3 (“The proposed security requirements in the Administration’s 
proposal would not dictate specific measures that may become outdated, but rather would 
require critical infrastructure to achieve security results using methods of their choice.”). 
 171. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 151, at 1031 (“Consumers have diffi-
culty detecting whether firms have made improvements to cyber defenses, leading to reluc-
tance to pay a security premium.”). 
 172. As we further argue, this claim might be false, as exposure could actually improve 
cybersecurity. See infra Section V.B.4. Note that even if a patch (a piece of software code 
repairing the security problem) is introduced together with the vulnerability report, prob-
lems might follow as the relevant entities might be too slow in applying this patch.  
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2.   Fixing Information and Knowledge Gaps 
 We now turn to discuss failures relating to CI operators’ ability to 
collect information and obtain knowledge on cyber attacks. In the face 
of these challenges, global regulators have acknowledged CI operators’ 
information and knowledge gaps and have offered various mecha-
nisms, with minimal intervention, to resolve this issue.  
 A centrally proposed model introduced the CERT (Computer Emer-
gency Response Teams) to mitigate information deficiencies. CERT 
features voluntary mechanisms to coordinate cyber information shar-
ing between relevant governments and firms (including CIs), as well 
as between firms themselves.173 In this manner, firms receive up-to-
date information on cyber threats in real time.174 
 Again, incentives are an issue: Some CIs may lack the necessary 
incentives to share critical information with CERT (which could en-
courage ‘free-riding’ by providing access to incident-related infor-
mation without the need to contribute). Therefore, supplementary 
measures are required. One relatively moderate set of measures in-
cludes granting safe harbors and immunity to companies that share 
information of a certain extent and degree with CERT.175 With such 
measures in place, these firms will not fear civil litigation resulting 
from such sharing, given potential breaches of users’ privacy.176 Note, 
however, that applying a safe harbor carries with it the risk that firms 
will share information strictly within its confines, rather than take a 
chance and broaden their sharing activities, out of fear that liability 
will immediately follow. Thus, the safe harbor must be constructed 
carefully. A more radical solution mandates that CI operators report 
cyber attacks in real-time.177 
 Let us now turn to knowledge deficits. To some extent, government 
initiatives that generate knowledge and enable information sharing be-
tween firms could bridge the gap. Not surprisingly, there are various 
                                                                                                                  
 173. See, for example, the US-CERT at https://www.us-cert.gov/about-us. 
 174. Some scholars argue that a majority of states find information sharing highly im-
portant for cybersecurity. See Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 64, at 20 (“[T]he percentage 
of nations referencing reporting and sharing cyber threat information along with best prac-
tices was 64 percent . . . .”). 
 175. See discussion in Kesan & Hayes, supra note 33, at 1530.  
 176. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 169. Perhaps, to reduce chances of possible privacy 
violations, the state should not have access to such information. But see Bambauer, Sharing 
Shortcomings, supra note 158, at 469-72 (arguing that information sharing incentives are 
not required as firms will be motivated to do so); KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 34. 
 177. For a different analysis of this issue, see discussion in Kesan & Hayes, supra note 
33, at 1539-54 (applying literature pertaining to voluntary and mandatory information shar-
ing in other contexts to the specific cyber-related context).  
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initiatives around the world, including in the United States,178 support-
ing this dynamic. One such initiative is standardization,179 a process 
through which relevant firms and other stakeholders (including govern-
ment entities) negotiate to determine an acceptable response strategy 
and practice to cyber attacks on CI. At times (as noted in the discussion 
above about the role of the NIST),180 government intervention could fa-
cilitate the standardization process. If several standards are formed, the 
government could indicate which standard it prefers.181 Another initia-
tive creates partnerships, enabling collaboration between CI operators 
and cybersecurity companies, and among CI operators themselves. 
C.   Limited Intervention via Internalizing Externalities/Ex Ante  
Regulation and Incentives  
 Even if we were able to overcome the information and knowledge 
gaps, we would still be left with the problem of externalities, which 
leads to underinvestment in cybersecurity. Therefore, mechanisms 
need to be developed to ensure internalization of the damages of cyber 
attacks by CIs. Or at least, additional steps must be taken to further 
incentivize CIs to enhance cybersecurity efforts. Let us now examine 
two strategies that do this. 
 To overcome externality-related problems caused by cybersecurity 
risks, the regulator can enact regulation imposing liability on CI oper-
ators through tort law in regard to harms caused by successful cyber 
attacks.182 Another strategy is to impose administrative fines or even 
criminal liability on companies and/or their executives following CI 
failures that inflict damage. While these measures affect the CI after 
the risks have materialized and the damage has been done (i.e., ex 
post), they still might prove effective. In order to prevent liability and 
its consequences, CIs will act proactively and initiate measures that 
prevent their liabilities, be they tort, monetary fines, or criminal. 
Thus, these measures are clear examples of state intervention to reg-
ulate behavior of private parties ex ante by incentivizing preventive 
and precautionary steps to limit risk. These forms of regulation could 
be limited in their intrusiveness, but their effectiveness in this context 
is somewhat questionable.  
 Analytically, the success of such an ex post regulatory model relies 
on two implicit assumptions: (1) Ex ante conduct of the relevant enti-
ties can be sufficiently altered (in this case, CIs will implement proper 
cybersecurity measures) by imposing ex post liability, and (2) state 
                                                                                                                  
 178. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 33 (referring to HSPD-7). 
 179. The NIST is a good example of standardization. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 180. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 181. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 38. 
 182. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 173; KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 14. 
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agents (legislature, regulators, and/or courts) can identify, establish, 
and enforce a proper standard of conduct for these firms after the fact. 
These two basic assumptions are acceptable in many instances, but 
the cybersecurity context presents unique challenges that could reduce 
the efficacy of this ex post strategy.  
 As noted, one of the central motivations for imposing and enforcing 
ex post liability is to deter ex ante activity. In this specific context, ex 
post liability is imposed upon CI aggressors183 in an effort to curb such 
attacks and possibly on the CI itself, which failed to properly protect 
itself (again, to deter CIs from applying lax standards of protection).184 
Before proceeding to discuss CI liability, let us add a few words regard-
ing direct liability on the attackers. It is quite clear that establishing 
(even harsh) liability rules against CI attackers does not and will not 
sufficiently protect CI from cyber attacks185 These attacks are difficult 
to identify and even more difficult to litigate and prosecute. Thus, CI 
attackers are insufficiently deterred.  
 Therefore, let us focus on ex post deterrence of CI operators to mo-
tivate them into adopting proper cyber security measures. Here too, 
we should remain skeptical of this scheme's success. At the ex ante 
stage, CIs may not significantly fear the prospect of ex post sanctions. 
The prospects of cyber threats materializing (if adopting lax security 
measures) are uncertain. Even if an attack were to occur, it would be 
difficult to pin the blame on the firm and prove that it resulted from 
the CI’s negligence.186 It is thus unlikely that ex post liability will mo-
tivate or incentivize CIs to applying proper security measures.  
 Let us elaborate on this thought further: Remember, the particular 
characteristics of cyber attacks make assigning blame and attribution 
                                                                                                                  
 183. An example of such method can be traced in the United States. In 2015, President 
Barack Obama issued a new Executive Order that “empower[s] the administration to apply 
sanctions against individuals and groups that threaten the nation’s critical infrastructure 
through malicious activities in cyberspace.” Aaron Boyd, Obama Signs Order Authorizing 
Sanctions Against Cyber Criminals, FED. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.federal-
times.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/04/01/obama-executive-order-sanctions-
cyber-criminals/70770684 [https://perma.cc/EG3G-QANN]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,694, 
80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015). 
 184. For more on deterrence and economic analysis of crime, see generally Gary S. 
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Note 
that, generally speaking, deterrence theory had been widely criticized over the years. See, 
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Theory of Value Dilemma: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of 
Criminal Law, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 643, 643-47 (2004). 
 185. Mark Grady & Francesco Parisi, The Law and Economics of Cybersecurity: An In-
troduction, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 1, 1 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco 
Parisi eds., 2006) (“Cybercrime . . . is highly resistant to the usual methods of prevention 
and deterrence.”). 
 186. For a similar argument regarding cybersecurity, see generally Deirdre K.  
Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for Cybersecurity, 140 DAEDALUS 70, 73-74 (2011). 
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in the cyber realm difficult187 or there could be various entities that 
have jointly caused the failure in the CI protection as well as the 
claimed damages.188 The court (or the legislature) will be required to 
decide on highly complex questions regarding the scope of the direct 
and/or indirect economic consequences that are actionable, and to de-
cide who has legal standing to claim such damages.189 The expected 
complexity of such decisions, and the extended time such proceedings 
take, might again undermine deterrence.  
 Perhaps enacting harsher ex post measures against CI operators 
for security breaches—such as criminal liability against executives—
could offer a solution.190 However, strict requirements could poten-
tially backfire. They might set a disproportionally high standard of be-
havior for worthy players in the field, leading to undesired exits by 
capable individuals and their firms, who will not want to risk criminal 
liability. Therefore, the use of this drastic measure should be limited. 
 Yet perhaps an even greater challenge in regulating CIs ex post in 
the cyber context is establishing and enforcing the liability standard 
after the fact.191 As noted, according to this ex post regulatory model, 
the state does not require CI operators to adhere to cybersecurity 
standards which are examined ex ante. With that, a CI operator who 
does not ex ante implement proper standards could be held liable in 
court if an attack unfolds and damage is caused.  
 Defining liability in this context is complex, but nonetheless critical 
for this model to succeed. Courts are obvious candidates for setting 
liability standards—a difficult and arduous task. Deciding after the 
fact whether a specific CI’s conduct met a reasonableness standard will 
generate very vague messages and rules for CIs contemplating the 
form of system and method to implement. In addition, judges might 
lack the sufficient expertise to make such rulings in this highly technical 
context. Errors in the process will undermine its success. To resolve both 
problems, courts could rely upon a set of standards endorsed by the 
state; meeting this standard, therefore, would provide a safe harbor for 
CI operators and immunity from liability. In that way, it could de facto 
                                                                                                                  
 187. See KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 16; see also supra note 26. 
 188. On this matter, we can separate “joint and several liability” as a possible solution 
to the attribution problem. See KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 39. For a discussion of the chal-
lenge of applying the “economic loss” doctrine from tort law, which confronts the difficulties 
of establishing the extent of claimed damages in the cyber-security context, see generally 
David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the 
Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935 (2016). 
 189. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 172. 
 190. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 15. 
 191. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 173. 
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become a mandatory standard for CI operators.192 Below we discuss the 
challenges government entities face in setting such standards;193 yet 
briefly note here that such practices are highly problematic and there is 
a good chance they will not lead to an optimal outcome.  
 To summarize, ex post internalization models raise many analytic 
difficulties and are unlikely to lead to an acceptable regulatory re-
sponse to the cybersecurity challenge. We concede that liability rules 
might be fitting in this context for various ethical reasons, and as a 
means of promoting distributive or corrective justice. Yet these issues 
are beyond our current inquiry.194 It is also noteworthy that a possible 
solution to the challenges discussed here is a functioning cyber-liabil-
ity insurance market.195 If CI operators were able to purchase insur-
ance for all damages caused by cyber attacks, insurance companies 
would be charged with confronting (successfully or not) cybersecurity 
challenges. Insurance companies would monitor the actions of various 
relevant entities, determine standards for action, and update them ac-
cording to the progress of technology and the realization of the risks.196 
These insurance markets are still in their infancy.197 Therefore, this 
aspect must be revisited in the future. 
 The ideas we discuss directly above focus on measures to internalize 
negative externalities, which have proven to be ineffective. We can ap-
proach the issue from a different avenue: by providing direct and indirect 
incentives to CI operators who sufficiently adapt to cyber challenges.198 
Incentives can take the form of direct payments for meeting cybersecu-
rity standards,199 a right to participate in government tenders,200 or tax 
benefits based on criteria related to cybersecurity measures. In addition 
                                                                                                                  
 192. Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Ex-
ploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable 
National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 314 (2015). 
 193. See infra Section V.B. 
 194. For more on liability, see generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). 
 195. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 173; KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 19-20. 
 196. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 173; Opderbeck, supra note 188, at 973-74. 
 197. For a literature review on this issue, see SASHA ROMANOSKY, DOCKET NO. 130206115-
3115-01, COMMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ON INCENTIVES TO ADOPT IMPROVED 
CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 4 (2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/romanosky_comments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9EDX-GDHB]. 
 198. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 21. 
 199. Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 21, at 658-59. 
 200. Derek Bambauer proposes using “the carrot and the stick” approach. See Bam-
bauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 151, at 1018; see also id. at 1062-78 (describing 
approach); KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 20-21 (advocating providing direct incentives and 
the use of government procurement). 
2017]  CYBERSECURITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 557 
  
 
to incentivizing their implementation, the state could provide cybersecu-
rity tools and assistance to CI operators without charge.  
 However, such direct incentives also insufficiently incentivize imple-
menting adequate CI cybersecurity measures. Even with such incen-
tives in place, some CI operators might decide that their implementa-
tion is not worthwhile after considering the potential costs of applying 
such protective measures and their interference with CI operations. 
Furthermore, this type of policy may face political opposition. The pub-
lic, who in many cases is dissatisfied with public utilities/private CIs, 
may oppose the redirection of its taxpayer money to these firms’ pockets 
for services the CIs are expected to provide and that are already paid 
for. And again, the success of the model relies on the state’s ability to 
set cybersecurity standards and monitor their implementation—a prac-
tice that, as we shall see shortly, generates substantial problems. 
 To conclude this Section, the ability to create a market-based regu-
latory regime, which is supplemented by mere disclosure obligations, 
knowledge transfers, tailored incentives, or ex post regulation, is un-
satisfactory.201 Therefore, it is necessary to consider other mechanisms 
to drive companies to implement proper cybersecurity measures, such 
as ex ante regulations mandating specific steps. 
V.   MODELS OF CIP: EX ANTE REGULATION 
A.   Direct Governmental Intervention: Strategies and Benefits 
 Our discussion thus far has focused on regulatory strategies prem-
ised upon market-driven outcomes, with the state engaging in limited 
interventions when market and social forces are destined to fail. In 
this Part, we examine the opposite side of the regulatory spectrum—a 
CI cybersecurity regulatory scheme that is premised upon direct gov-
ernment supervision. Here, the state regulates and determines which 
defense mechanisms CI operators must adopt, enforces their imple-
mentation, and monitors compliance.202 These activities would most 
likely be undertaken by a designated state agency that would collabo-
rate with other governmental security agencies to obtain information 
on offensive and defensive cyber measures and thus increase its suc-
cess. As discussed below, the overall scheme might be cloaked, at least 
partially, in secrecy. 
 While this regulatory scheme is a far cry from the current U.S. ap-
proach, it is nonetheless important to consider. As noted, several coun-
tries have already implemented similar strategies, and it is possible 
                                                                                                                  
 201. For a similar stand in the United States, see Clayton, supra note 107. 
 202. For a discussion of a similar option, see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 33, at 1545-46 
(requiring the entities posing the highest risk to adopt NIST standards).  
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that others will follow.203 Furthermore, regulating the means by which 
CIs are protected from cyber attacks, resulting from terrorist acts or 
acts by hostile nations, seemingly fits within the state’s overall role of 
protecting citizens from attacks and hostilities—a task not commonly 
assigned to the private sector.204 In addition, a discussion of this option 
allows for an overall analysis of other regulatory measures. The result 
of this discussion, when integrated with the discussions noted above, 
formulates an optimal framework, which we present in Part VI.  
 A government-centered regulatory scheme could be implemented us-
ing several measures: direct, mandatory legislation that maps out the 
bodies subject to it and their obligations, or a licensing regime that re-
quires CI operators to be licensed and that has various cyber-related ob-
ligations and requirements. The analysis below discusses government-
centered regulation in principle, regardless of the specific means selected.  
 Government-centered regulation has several advantages, many of 
which are the mirror image of the shortcomings of the market-based 
schemes discussed above. Above all, this model provides a simple re-
sponse to the problem of limited incentives for meeting cybersecurity 
standards. Here, the standards are set by the state, which also en-
forces and monitors their implementation. Furthermore, concerns re-
garding information and knowledge deficits and gaps could also be re-
solved. The government can serve as a central hub for both information 
and knowledge. Because the government would receive and handle all 
relevant cyber attack information, the government-centered scheme 
would overcome the business and legal constraints mentioned in our 
analysis on the market-based model. Furthermore, the government can 
integrate into this process additional information to which it is privy, 
i.e., information received from its military and intelligence agencies.205  
 Similar advantages can be realized regarding the production and 
flow of knowledge and expertise. The state is well situated to acquire 
relevant expertise regarding cyber attacks and defenses by recruiting 
relevant experts who can continuously advise on defensive measures 
that will be distributed to all CI operators. Here again, the government 
could integrate insights from other security and intelligence agencies 
taking part in cyber defense (and even offensive) initiatives, without 
the risk of compromising state secrets or intelligence assets.  
                                                                                                                  
 203. See supra Section III.B. 
 204. See BAKER ET AL., IN THE CROSS FIRE, supra note 142, at 26 (“You wouldn’t go to a 
post office and ask them how they’re tending to their own ballistic missile defense . . . but that 
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 Beyond these noted advantages, direct government regulation ena-
bles two additional features to enhance the efficiency of CI protection 
and confers unique benefits for the cyber context: secrecy and concen-
tration (or centralization). A government agency can engage in fram-
ing and enforcing cyber strategy in relative secrecy. In the cyber con-
text, secrecy can prove beneficial, as knowledge of security measures 
can be exploited by potential attackers to increase their chances of suc-
cess.206 Secrecy, therefore, promotes security.207 
 A governmental-driven regulatory scheme also allows for concentra-
tion of information, knowledge, and decision making within one entity. 
Of course, an abundance of regulators could be vested with regulating 
CIs.208 This situation is less than ideal. When authority is divided be-
tween several regulators, each authority might act to increase its power 
at the expense of the other, causing a power struggle between the vari-
ous agencies. This could lead to poor decision making and inefficiency.209  
B.   Shortcomings and Risks of a Governmental-Centric Approach 
1.   Ex-Ante Regulation and Optimizing Knowledge 
 The noted advantages of direct regulation of CI cyber risks seem to 
resolve many of the concerns noted in previous Sections. Yet, with 
these advantages come other problems. And while the global trend 
may be toward state-centric protection of CIs, many scholars and pol-
icymakers argue that this regulatory trajectory is unwise. Some find 
the claim that a single government entity “can micro-manage every 
aspect of cybersecurity and dictate best practice[s] is hubris.”210  
                                                                                                                  
 206. Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different 
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 209. KERFOOT, supra note 138, at 25-26, 29. 
 210. Id. at 32. 
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 One powerful set of critiques points to the inefficiency of the govern-
ment-led regulatory scheme. These critiques state that government en-
tities are not the optimal custodian and aggregator of knowledge in a 
cyber context.211 Quite to the contrary, it is more likely that knowledge 
generated and held by the state will prove to be subpar.212 Intuitively, 
in technological contexts, expertise lies mainly with external and di-
verse experts rather than the central government. The state can hire 
experts and learn from them, but so can private companies. There are 
no guarantees that the state will know which experts to listen to. In-
deed, the state might be highly motivated to objectively choose the best 
solutions (we reconsider this notion below),213 but its lack of expertise 
could affect its choice and lead it to select a suboptimal strategy. 
 Beyond this general concern with the government’s inability to ob-
tain relevant knowledge, we critically assess five specific shortcomings 
that pertain to various technological aspects of the cyber protection con-
text. First, scholars opine that the negative impact of a government-led 
regulatory model could extend well beyond the level of CI protection re-
quired, and affect aspects of cyber research. When the state, rather than 
the market, dictates conduct, this might affect overall innovation in the 
field.214 Innovation will be steered toward the specific issues government 
deems interesting, rather than naturally developing in an optimal di-
rection. But an important caveat is due. Cyberspace is developing rap-
idly; state influence may be minor and narrowly focused. Thus, innova-
tion could proceed without substantial interference. 
 Second, even if the state were capable of establishing a reasonable 
blueprint to respond to cyber threats, it would have more difficulty in 
updating and amending this blueprint due to the fast pace of the con-
stant, overall changes in the cyber field.215 The realm of cyber risks is 
highly volatile, and quick responses are necessary. In other fields, the 
fact that policy changes take time might not lead to devastating out-
comes. It might even enable better policymaking, as it allows for re-
sponsible decision making after in-depth consultation. This is not true 
for the cyber realm, which is arguably unique in that it is constantly 
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undergoing change.216 For example, a powerful critique of the FERC 
standard-setting process in the energy market featured a slow-moving 
process, in which an updated standard was retracted at the time of its 
approval because it was already outdated.217 
 Third, state monitoring and enforcement could lead to an undesir-
able practice of ‘box checking’ or ‘box ticking.’218 When responsibility 
rests on the shoulders of the state to set standards for cyber defense, 
some corporations will simply comply without further examining 
whether such protection is optimal. Therefore, greater involvement of 
relevant players in the process is necessary. Note that this critique 
also pertains to other instances in which the defense standard is set 
by external (even commercial) parties.  
 Fourth, recent trends in the technological practices of private com-
panies tend to further minimize the benefits of governmental regula-
tion. In the past, such companies, including private CIs, relied upon 
proprietary software—computer code written specifically for them. 
However, financial and compatibility concerns pressured many com-
panies to switch to Commercial, Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software.219 
This transition offers advantages and disadvantages for cybersecurity 
that are beyond the scope of our analysis.220 However, this change has 
clear implications for our current discussion; with COTS, specific gov-
ernments have less of an advantage in identifying and resolving cyber 
threats. Here, the global commercial market is faced with similar chal-
lenges, and it is likely that expertise lies there. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state-driven and man-
dated mechanism of CI cyber defense is only meaningful when coupled 
with effective enforcement. Arguably, the state could impose various 
sanctions against companies that fail to comply, including requiring 
that they cease operations (note the authority vested with the DHS in 
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the chemical sector), or terminating their CI license.221 However, en-
forcement is not easily achieved since it requires substantial resources. 
The FERC’s experiences in enforcing cyber defense standards illumi-
nate the difficulties in enforcing such standards with government-
budgeted manpower and resources.222 Furthermore, in many cases, 
private CIs that are subject to regulation are powerful entities that are 
not easily penalized by the regulator (certainly not severely—after all, 
they control a critical infrastructure). Notably, even without enforce-
ment, a government-based approach could increase knowledge and im-
prove information sharing in real time, but such goals could be 
achieved while applying more lenient, and even optimal, measures. 
2.   State Regulation, Knowledge Gaps, and External  
Considerations 
 When the state chooses standards that apply to the entire CI market, 
fears of regulatory capture and undue influence come into play, as do 
concerns of the impact of other external considerations.223 Indeed, au-
thorizing the State to set cyber-security standards that bind private CIs 
brings about known dangers which come with governmental interven-
tions. In this context, such concerns could have substantial and specific 
negative consequences. In addition, the government will turn to exter-
nal bodies for advice, and external counsel is in fact useful.224 Particu-
larly regarding cyber issues, the government needs all the help it can 
receive. But there is a thin line between desirable consultation and un-
acceptable undue influence. In the cyber context, it is reasonable to ex-
pect this line will be crossed. Moreover, options for effective oversight, 
which could mitigate problematic practices, are limited. These substan-
tial concerns are relevant and need to be accounted for. They could even 
lead to a decision to opt against extensive governmental intervention. 
 Two separate interests have the potential to cloud the regulator's 
judgment: those of technology companies and sectoral competitors of 
private CIs. Each form of influence leads to two different forms of con-
cern: suboptimal levels of protection and the negative impact on com-
petition and consumers.225  
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 The first, more intuitive concern pertains to lobbying and other 
forms of pressure applied by cyber tech firms. According to public 
choice theory, companies and interest groups have a clear incentive to 
pressure the regulator to choose favorable measures and standards 
that are the most profitable for them.226 As such, lobbying initiatives 
could persuade government officials to select technologies and cyber-
security firms based on lobbying strength, not objective measures re-
lating to optimum security. Here, implications of this selection could 
prove dire, as this dynamic could lead to inferior levels of protection. 
However, the consequences of effective lobbying do not need to be so 
dramatic. It is more likely that the sole harm of the public choice dy-
namic will be inefficiency, as the regulator will choose superfluous se-
curity measures that create unnecessary costs for CIs, which will ulti-
mately roll them on to consumers or lead CIs to cut costs elsewhere 
and refrain from providing vital services. Furthermore, the complexity 
and relative opacity of the cyber context complicates public oversight 
of these processes227 and allows lobbying forces to take their toll, thus 
exacerbating this problem.  
 The second concern is more complex and addresses problematic 
competitive maneuvering among private CIs and other firms. In their 
efforts to gain a competitive edge, firms often strive to burden their 
rivals with regulatory obligations. We refer to this form of problematic 
influence as regulatory incitement; a process by which interest groups 
(often under the guise of legitimate concern to protect the state or con-
sumers) aim to convince regulators to adopt standards that negatively 
affect their competitors, and might, in fact, be unnecessary. The nega-
tive effect could be a financial encumbrance upon the competitor, or it 
can prove to be a technical nuisance that diverts the firm’s attention and 
resources. In the cyber context, this might occur when interested parties 
convince the government to encumber various CIs with unnecessary 
cyber protection measures to create costs and slow down operators.  
 This last assertion may, at first, seem to result from mere paranoia. 
However, regulatory incitement concerns are based on past events. 
One good example of this is when citizens (or perhaps those with 
vested interests) pressured the Federal Communications Commission 
                                                                                                                  
fairness and efficiency of the regulatory process in the context of data security. Note however, 
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 227. See infra Section V.B.4. 
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(FCC) to ensure new cellular and Internet telephony provided emer-
gency communication capabilities (specifically, location identification 
functions). While critically examining these incidents, Susan Crawford 
warned that the real motive behind the regulatory-driven technology 
requirements was pressure by wireline/telecom giants to slow down 
and delay rising competing forces through regulations that imposed 
extra costs on them.228 In other words, wireline/telecom giants engaged 
in regulatory incitement.  
 A critical reader might argue that regulatory incitement is not ap-
plicable to our current discussion on CI cybersecurity, which does not 
focus on competition between monopolies and upcoming forces, but ra-
ther among monopolies themselves. In such a case, a specific firm’s 
effort to convince the regulatory body to add burdens to its competitors 
would be of little use, as these additional burdens will be quickly ap-
plied to the firm itself, thus eliminating the competitive advantage. 
But the dynamic nature of markets renders the regulatory incitement 
argument relevant nonetheless. New players are constantly entering 
the markets and competing against existing CI owners (for instance, 
consider renewable energy providers or novel models of spectrum com-
munication). Therefore, such concerns should not be taken lightly. To 
some extent, they unfolded during the negotiations in Europe regard-
ing the final language of the NIS Directive and the definition of “Digi-
tal Service Providers,” which are subjected to some regulatory require-
ments. Here, for instance, social networks were excluded from the final 
version while search engines were not.229 This discussion further illu-
minates how vesting the government with the power to decide on the 
technological standards private firms must implement can lead to 
suboptimal outcomes with potential harm to consumers and a failure 
to prevent CI cyber risks.  
3.   Constitutionality, Human Rights, and Legality 
 State actions are scrutinized according to their legality, constitu-
tionality, and impact upon individual rights; cyber risks are not excep-
tional. A full discussion of this aspect justifies (at least) a separate ar-
ticle. At this juncture, we merely strive to map out possible points of 
tension between this regulatory approach (of extensive governmental 
intervention in the cyber-regulation of CI) and individual rights.  
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 We begin by examining the relatively simple aspects. Closely regu-
lating CIs’ actions encumbers their property rights, as well as some 
aspects of freedom of occupation.230 In terms of property, many CI op-
erators are private entities; thus, any obligations, restrictions, and 
costs could negatively affect their property rights. Indeed, the cyberse-
curity-based regulations discussed here impose costs and restrictions 
on a firm's operations. One aspect of the property rights inspection re-
lates to the Fifth Amendment claim of ‘regulatory taking.’ Establishing 
whether regulation of public utilities constitutes a Fifth Amendment 
‘regulatory taking’231 requires a case-by-case analysis to account for: 
(1) its economic impact; (2) its interference with investment-backed 
expectations, and (3) the nature of government actions.232 In addition, 
the regulation must be precise; vague regulation could be considered 
unconstitutional.233 However, reasonable and narrowly tailored regu-
lations usually pass constitutional muster. The regulation can also be 
challenged for restricting occupational rights. However, these rights 
(especially in this specific context) are most likely not constitutionally 
protected, and therefore this challenge will not prove substantial.234 
 An even more substantial rights-based challenge pertains to the 
right to privacy and fears of its violation.235 As opposed to the previous 
discussion, which focused on the relevant rights of the CI operators, 
the discussion on privacy rights focus on the rights of the vast cus-
tomer base. Indeed, CI firms hold colossal amounts of consumer per-
sonal data. Consider telecom operators, with their massive datasets of 
metadata regarding phone calls, data exchanges, and locations, as well 
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as their access to the content of the communications themselves. Be-
yond telecommunications, in the age of ‘smart metering,’236 energy pro-
viders can map out entire lives using the data at their disposal.  
 As a general outline of privacy risks,237 we note concerns related to 
the two distinct objectives of government—data sharing (including 
real-time data) and enforcement of appropriate technical standards. 
Each of these raises distinct privacy concerns. First, consider data 
sharing. As explained above, the government will aggregate and store 
massive amounts of data pertaining to the CI’s ongoing operation to 
limit information failures.238 While the government may not intend for 
the data to be personal, some could prove to be personally identifiable, 
i.e., it may be possible to match specific individuals using data analyt-
ics relying on additional and external data sets.239 This is true because 
the data pertains to traffic and usage of the networks, and therefore 
possibly reflects the traits and preferences of its users. In this in-
stance, privacy interests are compromised as personal information 
makes its way to the government without consumers’ specific ap-
proval. This in itself could cause security risks as well: a central data-
base of such sensitive nature encourages hacking attempts, particu-
larly if the data is unsecure.  
 Second, consider enforcing technical standards. At this point, the 
government is faced with a difficult decision. Lenient enforcement of 
such standards—which might be reduced to providing requirements 
and reviewing response reports—will have limited implications on con-
sumer privacy rights; yet it risks being proved ineffective. A more ex-
tensive monitoring model allows for constant monitoring and authori-
zation to engage in surprise inspections and audits to ensure a higher 
level of compliance. But such extensive inspections of CI systems could 
compromise user rights; again, their personal data could be subject to 
government scrutiny as part of these monitoring initiatives. Even if, 
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in practice, government agents did not actually review this infor-
mation, their ability to do so is troubling enough.240 Such worries go 
beyond other instances in which government officials often engage in 
inspections, such as those pertaining to food and drug manufacturing 
or enforcing building standards and fire codes. In all these instances, 
government officials (merely) enter and inspect private property. The 
cyber context, however, features a personal-data rich environment in 
which the potential for privacy harm is substantially enhanced.  
 Both of the noted scenarios compromise privacy interests by subject-
ing individuals to the threatening surveillance capabilities of the State. 
They might also have a chilling effect, where individuals may actually 
curb or reconsider specific forms of behavior in light of the threat of gov-
ernment access to personal data. Therefore, structuring a regulatory 
scheme that provides government with access to personal information 
held by CI operators compromises privacy rights on a normative and 
theoretical level. The problems arising here also exceed those unfolding 
in instances in which the firms share the information voluntarily with 
the government; in these instances, information sharing would likely be 
limited and subject to provisions of the consumer contracts.  
 It is unclear whether rules requiring data sharing by and technical 
auditing of CIs raise actual constitutional concerns under the current 
doctrine. The privacy rights here discussed are impermissibly compro-
mised when the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
breached.241 This usually requires an illegal or unauthorized search242 
to occur. It is currently unclear whether individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of personal information privacy regarding personal infor-
mation (especially metadata) held by ‘third parties’ such as public util-
ities.243 Nonetheless, privacy concerns regarding both the potential ac-
cessibility to personal data, as well as actual access to such data, must 
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be considered. Notably, the current constitutional balance as set by the 
Supreme Court might be realigned. Moreover, in light of public pres-
sure, the legislature may consider a more protective standard of pri-
vacy (which goes beyond the limited protection afforded by the Consti-
tution) when considering the regulation of this matter, as it recently 
did in related contexts of national security and law enforcement.244  
 Privacy-based concerns do not necessarily undermine the notion 
that government must closely regulate CI cyber security efforts. Ra-
ther, they should be considered when designing a regulatory scheme. 
For instance, they should impact the form of information shared and 
the manner in which government audits are conducted. Information 
sharing (either voluntarily or under mandate) or government access to 
CI datasets, must only be permitted after the implementation of over-
sight and safeguard mechanisms that protect privacy objectives.  
 To conclude, our analysis points to some weaker rights of the firm 
that might be compromised by such regulation, and a substantial 
right—consumer right of privacy—the infringement of which must be 
considered in any regulation designed. A concluding note regarding 
this matter pertains to the general notion of legality and the fear of 
overall inappropriate government intervention. The legal and techno-
logical mechanisms discussed here open the door to governmental 
overreach.245 They evoke fear of the creeping extension of state power 
and thus undermining the rule of law. This overall concern must be 
accounted for as well when designing the relevant regulatory scheme, 
and is closely tied to the notion of the secrecy the process entails, which 
we now address.  
4.   Secrecy 
 A regulatory scheme governing CI cybersecurity will most likely be 
premised upon a certain degree of secrecy, given the nature of govern-
ment activities in this context, as well as government’s overall prefer-
ence for opacity.246 As with our previous discussion concerning privacy, 
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the notion of ‘secrecy’ does not constitute a definite critique of the gov-
ernment-based regulatory scheme, yet is merely a factor that must be 
considered in its design.  
 The extent of secrecy needed is also linked to decisions regarding 
the nature of the government entity that oversees this form of cyber-
security regulation. In the United States, much of the current author-
ity is vested in the DHS—which is not part of the military or intelli-
gence community. The DHS’s civilian culture is reflected in its trans-
parency practices regarding CIP regulation.247 On its website, anyone 
can read recommended security standards and guidelines, all openly 
published. Questionnaires sent to CI operators on the subject are also 
available as well.248 
 Yet one can easily imagine an alternative structure, one in which 
an intelligence agency, such as the NSA, is vested with this author-
ity.249 Worldwide, countries are struggling with determining which 
type of entity should be vested with this authority.250 Transferring the 
authority discussed herein to a security/intelligence/military-like en-
tity could have various operational benefits. Such a scheme would al-
low for better integration of information from intelligence sources, 
combining the mission of protecting civilian CIs with military purposes 
such as prevention and even preemptive attacks. One could even envi-
sion a situation in which the government agency withholds infor-
mation on a vulnerability found while monitoring cyber defenses from 
CIs and the public, opting to use it offensively. Note, however, that the 
balance between CI sustainability and national security, which un-
folded in this last example regarding the discovery of vulnerabilities, 
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might not be publicly acceptable. Some might not even see this out-
come as a ‘benefit’ at all. Nonetheless, such a shift in the task of regu-
lating CI protection to an intelligence or military agency offers a very 
different management culture. This would obviously have an impact 
on the extent of secrecy and transparency of the regulatory process.251  
 It is therefore imperative to examine the importance of secrecy (or 
transparency) in the cyber risk regulation scheme as either a primary 
objective or an unavoidable byproduct of a specific regulatory strategy. 
Intuitively, secrecy can ensure a high level of cybersecurity. This intu-
ition is premised on the conventional wisdom that revealing infor-
mation to the public, and thus to the enemy, may harm security objec-
tives. ‘Loose lips sink ships,’ the well-known World War II phrase, 
clearly expresses this notion. Therefore, secrecy is certainly not an un-
fortunate consequence, but a coveted objective. 
 But secrecy in the context of cybersecurity is distinct from that of 
military secrecy: Transparency does not pose a threat like those posed 
by leaked secure information; for example, the location of ships at bat-
tle.252 The potential attacker most likely knows the defensive measures 
deployed or could acquire this knowledge.253 Therefore, transparency 
does not necessarily increase risks and has many advantages. For in-
stance, transparency could actually promote better cyber protection. 
Informing the public of the selected cyber security methods and strat-
egies allows control and oversight of the agency and CI operators  
and consequentially motivates firms to improve and increase their  
protection levels.254 
 In contrast, secrecy could attract criticism and thus erode public 
trust. The lack of trust can directly undermine the success of cyber 
protection efforts. Public criticism of a secretive cyber protection 
scheme could adversely affect a variety of players in the field. Politi-
cians, who fear negative public image could weaken the scheme or fail 
to promote it; the press, due to criticism, might strive to undermine it; 
and even private firms providing infrastructure or defensive measures 
may choose to not cooperate with the state in this regard, even when 
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required by law. This, indeed, could be the reason the NSA is not fully 
engaged in cyber-related activities in the United States, although it 
certainly has the capacity to do so.255 
 Finally, greater transparency can mitigate several concerns linked 
to the potential rights violations noted above. Secrecy essentially in-
creases the power of policymakers, which increases the public’s fears 
and the actual risk that policymakers will exceed their mandate and 
undermine legality. Transparency reduces this fear. In addition, trans-
parency aids in safeguarding other fundamental rights, particularly 
the right to privacy, mainly by ensuring a legal and public discourse 
on the issue, which will enable audit mechanisms and improve citizen 
protections. In addition, public insight into government actions is a 
right on its own, although it is often balanced with other rights.256 
 To conclude, we return to the notion of design. Our objective in this 
Section is not to advocate for full and complete transparency of all ac-
tions of governmental groups regulating cyber security. However, it 
does call for a middle ground—e.g., publishing general principles as to 
how the CIs are regulated and inspected (a practice the DHS currently 
follows)—which allows for partial fulfillment of transparency goals. 
Another option is requiring that the relevant regulating entity selec-
tively share its information while collaborating with external experts 
(of both technological and social background). This Section also pro-
vides various factors to consider when deciding on the nature of the 
agency vested with the governmental authorities discussed herein, as 
well as the extent of their operations.  
5.   Centralization 
 A CIP government-based regulatory scheme may feature centrali-
zation—the concentration of all cyber-related protection schemes 
within one expert entity. Prima facie centralization is seemingly ad-
vantageous in this regulatory strategy, as is explained above.257 How-
ever, centralization has its own shortcomings. Yet again, we must note 
that the centralization issue is not an inherent flaw in a government 
regulatory scheme, but an element to be considered in its design.  
 Centralization of decisions could compromise the principle of diver-
sity,258 an important concept often noted in security-related literature. 
                                                                                                                  
 255. See ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 197. 
 256. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530-31 (2013); Fen-
ster, supra note 246, at 895-96. 
 257. See supra Section V.A. 
 258. See ROSENZWEIG, supra note 138, at 180; Benkler, supra note 207, at 295; Julie 
Gallagher, Importance of Redundancy, Diverse Systems Grows Post-9/11, Stresses Hartford 
572  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:515 
  
This concept states that CI operators must refrain from implementing 
the same or similar cybersecurity measures in a variety of CI contexts. 
Heterogeneity is therefore crucial to assure cybersecurity, so that a 
weakness in one security system will not necessarily affect other sys-
tems.259 With diverse systems in place, damage caused by a successful 
cyber attack that relied on an identified vulnerability will be specific, 
easy to confine, and simpler to fix.  
 However, it would be unwise to conclude that centralized cyber reg-
ulation leads to homogeneity in cybersecurity measures. We need not 
assume that the centralized entity is unaware of the problems of homo-
geneity and will not implement heterogeneous models of protection. On 
the contrary, arguably centralized cyber regulation can optimally en-
sure diversity. Given their central position, this entity can indeed assure 
that different cybersecurity measures are applied at different junctures, 
and thus, help increase the resilience of the system as a whole. 
 Nonetheless, centralization can pose risks to the diversity principle. 
The regulating entity is, by nature, led by a single management phi-
losophy and approach. This fact could lead to unified defense mecha-
nisms for the country’s infrastructure, and inherently risk the state. 
In light of this concern, the alternative model of CI owners’ self-regu-
lation may offer an advantage in that it may encourage conceptual di-
versity.260 Indeed, when the central entity takes merely an advisory 
role, this concern is mitigated. Another solution is sectorial regulation. 
However, this last solution raises many problems that result from 
power struggles as to the confines of every sector and the authority to 
regulate entities that might fall within several sectors.  
VI.   THE OPTIMAL CIP MODEL: A BLUEPRINT 
 We now turn from our analytical study and roadmap of policy critiques 
to concrete recommendations. We must first acknowledge that each con-
text calls for a separate balance and analysis; nonetheless, our discussion 
above allows us to point out several crucial elements for optimal CI pro-
tection, even though they will no doubt entail a few disadvantages.  
 We begin with several general observations that are undisputed: 
the fear of cyber attacks is not a work of fiction. CIs will very likely be 
attacked through cyber means, and these attacks will most likely 
                                                                                                                  
Financial’s Lowenthal, INFORMATIONWEEK: INS. & TECH. (Oct. 24, 2001, 9:05 AM), http:// 
www.insurancetech.com/architecture-infrastructure/14706497 [https://perma.cc/9CDA-LVCQ]. 
 259. See Nojeim, supra note 149, at 130 (arguing that setting a single standard “could actu-
ally worsen security because a vulnerability in a standardized system could affect many entities”). 
 260. Coldebella & White, supra note 215, at 241 (“A centrally planned, one-size-fits-all 
regulatory scheme would almost certainly eliminate useful, industry-developed security 
measures and replace them with an ill-fitting, nondynamic slate of requirements.”). 
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cause substantial damage.261 Accordingly, it is undisputable that CIs 
require proactive protection from cyber attacks. As we show, a market-
based approach, which has many advantages, cannot provide adequate 
protection on its own. Providing mere ex post incentives are also insuf-
ficient. Therefore, the current U.S. CIP approach is misguided and 
should be thoroughly reexamined. Our discussion in Part III leads to 
the conclusion that the state must play a more substantial role in CIP. 
In addition, and in interests of efficiency, expertise, and simplicity, a 
centralized agency is fitting for this role.262 Yet such a substantial role 
could take many forms. In the next few paragraphs we explore several 
central options 
 Designing an optimal CIP model requires paying special attention to 
the three central failings of the market-based approach: inadequate in-
formation sharing, lack of knowledge transfers, and underinvest-
ment.263 Let us examine their implications separately. Information 
sharing is an important (yet on its own, insufficient) 264 factor in cyber-
security schemes. It is essential for the identification of vulnerabilities 
that need patching and the early interception of threats.265 It allows CI 
operators to pool resources and enables collaborative problem solving.266 
 Therefore, the state must continue to proactively promote this form 
of data exchange among parties in real time. The government’s role is 
to facilitate—by structuring platforms, granting immunity for the 
practices of data transfers (from possible liability for privacy violations 
or antitrust wrongs), and assuring a high level of security in the pro-
cess. If these steps prove insufficient, the state may even be required 
to further mandate data sharing among the CIs themselves. Yet given 
privacy-related risks, it need not maintain a dataset of its own, unless 
such a data aggregation process was subjected to specific (perhaps 
                                                                                                                  
 261. One example of a successful cyber-attack on a power grid occurred in December 2015, 
in Ukraine, and interrupted power for 225,000 Ukrainians. See Tami Abdollah, US: Sophis-
ticated Attackers Hacked Ukrainian Electric Grid, YAHOO (Feb. 26, 2016), https:// 
www.yahoo.com/tech/us-sophisticated-attackers-hacked-ukrainian-electric-grid-212811154--
finance.html [https://perma.cc/Q4P8-UPFN]. 
 262. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 208, at 15. 
 263. See supra Part IV.A.  
 264. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 107 (“[E]xperts say cybersecurity needs go far be-
yond information sharing.”). 
 265. Palmer, supra note 17, at 314-16 (describing the need for public-private information 
sharing in CIP); Tim Molino, Sharing Cyber Threat Information: How It Would Work, and 
Why It Would Help Bolster Security, BSA TECHPOST (Apr. 15, 2013), http://techpost.bsa.org/ 
2013/04/15/sharing-cyber-threat-information-how-it-would-work-and-why-it-would-help-
bolster-security [https://perma.cc/5XM7-K6D4].  
 266. See Palmer, supra note 17, at 348. 
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even judicial) review.267 The fact that personal information is held by 
private entities does not mean that customers will approve of the data 
commonly winding up in the hands of the government.  
 Attending to and promoting sufficient knowledge transfers is no 
less challenging. While the knowledge gap problems noted are sub-
stantial, they do not necessitate extensive governmental intervention, 
nor do they mean that only the government can set appropriate cyber 
standards. Rather, the knowledge gap could be closed by facilitating 
knowledge sharing and transfer among relevant parties. This, in fact, 
is government’s proper role—assuring that cyber companies, CI oper-
ators, and government agencies join together in round tables to ex-
change and share knowledge. The state too must have a seat at the 
table; however, this does not imply that it should run the exchange or 
control the outcome. Furthermore, the state should not have the abil-
ity to dictate the standard eventually adopted, but rather provide feed-
back and contribute expertise and experience.268  
 Finally, we approach the regulator’s most substantial challenge—
the fear of underinvestment in CI cybersecurity measures. Here it is 
important to distinguish between the various facets related to this con-
cern. Generally, to overcome the ‘underinvestment’ challenge, a tech-
nological standard must be formulated, chosen, assigned, monitored, 
and enforced.  
 Given our analysis of knowledge sharing, the government does not 
need to formulate the standard for CI cyber-protection. It should, how-
ever, select one or more standards as a minimal threshold by which 
the CIs must abide. A panel of third-party representatives should ex-
amine these selections to ensure that the forms of undue influence 
noted above did not play a major role in the government’s decisions. In 
addition, such a review process is important to assure that other gov-
ernmental incentives, such as intentionally weakening security 
measures to enable surveillance,269 do not play a dominant role in the 
standard setting process. It is also important to structure the process 
                                                                                                                  
 267. Congress should explicitly define what constitutes “relevant information” for these 
purposes; otherwise, it would enable warrantless information-sharing on anything, regard-
less of cybersecurity. We witnessed such vagueness in the formation of “cyber threat indica-
tors” under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242. 
See supra Section III.A.1. 
 268. For proposals as to how such standards should be set, see Kesan & Hayes, supra 
note 33, at 1556-58.  
 269. The U.S. government has most likely engaged in such practices in the past. News 
reports and expert studies indicate that the NSA influenced NIST to introduce a weakness 
into an encryption standard so to allow future code-breaking and surveillance. See  
Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryp-
tion.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/WM4M-BD7C]. 
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in a manner that maintains the involvement of the CIs themselves. 
Such involvement is important to avoid a ‘box checking’ compliance 
culture270 and to assure that CIs maintain their willingness and ability 
to quickly respond to changing threats. This could be achieved by al-
lowing firms to challenge the standard chosen and offer more appro-
priate and efficient measures.  
 The state must act to monitor implementation of these requirements 
and cannot rely upon ex post regulation or other incentive structures. It 
must do so by setting reporting requirements to ensure compliance with 
the noted standards. In this sense, the United States could follow the 
lead of the European Union in their enacting of recent regulation.271 In 
addition, the government must play a more substantial role in enforcing 
the standards selected. However, if and when monitoring and auditing 
enforcement entails compromising privacy rights, such tasks must be 
allocated to private parties (which will report to the authorities). This 
step will mitigate public concerns of unchecked access to personal data 
by government officials. Finally, the state must be willing and able to 
sanction, and not just shame, noncompliant CIs. Carrying out these 
steps on a large, national scale would prove costly; yet, such costs are 
necessary in the current state of affairs.  
 Obviously, every regulatory scheme calls for exceptions, as is the 
case with the power and chemical sector. Here too, we suggest the 
United States follow the EU’s lead and introduce enhanced regulations 
for the telecommunications sector as it serves a double function in this 
context. Telecommunications are vulnerable to cyber attacks on their 
own and can also be used to launch cyber attacks against other CIs. 
Thus, attacks against this sector have particular ramifications. The 
United States has recognized this threat, and version 3.0 of its ‘Ein-
stein’ project (a U.S.-CERT program) is designed to prevent attacks by 
monitoring government computer traffic on private sector sites.272 
Thus, the telecom sector must be singled out and requires greater, 
more stringent mandatory CIP standards, although perhaps not 
standards as aggressive as those employed in the controversial ‘Ein-
stein’ project.273 But this type of intervention should be an exception to 
                                                                                                                  
 270. See supra Section V.B.1.  
 271. See supra Section III.B.   
 272. See Homeland Security Seeks Cyber Counterattack System, CNN (Oct. 4, 2008), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/10/04/chertoff.cyber.security/ [https://perma.cc/8UTU-7MPT]. 
 273. For a critique of this initiative, see Steven M. Bellovin et al., Can It Really Work? 
Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY 
J. 1 (2011).  
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the general CIP strategies and premised on a relevant risk assess-
ment.274 Furthermore, such steps must be implemented only after safe-
guards to assure sufficient protections for privacy are applied.  
 Lastly, we turn to the complicated issue of institutional designation 
and design. Given the value of transparency and the risks to individual 
rights, CI cyber regulation should be carried out by entities outside the 
military/intelligence community as much as possible. In specific con-
texts, where operational demands require regulation by the mili-
tary/intelligence arm, greater secrecy could be tolerated. In addition, 
and in the interest of protecting rights, promoting efficiency, and en-
suring heterogeneity in protection strategies, third parties and exter-
nal experts should be consulted when possible. Furthermore, various 
forms of oversight by other governmental branches should be intro-
duced when transparency must be limited for security reasons.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 It is undisputable that CIs require protection—even the term cho-
sen indicates their ‘critical’ nature. It is also evident that the cyber age 
and other geo-political risks have changed the scope of threats to CIs 
worldwide. Addressing the issue at hand raises several complicated 
questions. While it is relatively simple to explain ‘why’ CIs require pro-
tection and ‘why’ the type of protection offered must be reassessed, it 
is far more complicated to determine ‘which’ CIs should be regulated 
and ‘how’ that might be done. 
 This Article responds to these questions, analyzes the benefits and 
shortcomings of potential CIP regulation, and draws from the interna-
tional effort to respond to this threat and the existing scholarship ad-
dressing these efforts. Our discussion leads us to recommend greater 
government involvement through a central authority—one that must 
be carefully tailored to preserve individual rights that could be com-
promised. This Article calls for recalibrating some of the existing reg-
ulatory structure as soon as possible, recognizing that danger of up-
coming attacks is imminent.  
 Beyond our analysis herein, it is important to note that in protect-
ing CIs, no one nation is an island. Infrastructures are generally inter-
connected. Attacks against one could impact another country and its 
citizens. Therefore, the international aspects of this discussion must 
be recognized. Global information and knowledge sharing, as well as 
strategies to ensure compliance with internationally-set standards are 
becoming crucial for any CIP model. Obviously, implementing such 
                                                                                                                  
 274. For more on the process of risk assessment in CIP, see Yacov Haimes et al., Risk Anal-
ysis in Interdependent Infrastructures, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 
19, at 297; Marcelo Masera & Igor Nai Fovino, A Service-Oriented Approach for Assessing In-
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schemes will prove to be a difficult and delicate task and information 
sharing requirements must constantly be balanced against various 
state interests in the global realm. This additional analysis requires 
further research, which must follow. 
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